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SUMMARY
We consider a risk averse entrepreneur who approaches a diversified venture capitalist
(VC) for financing of a project with positive potential return. We develop several models
that capture key features of the venture financing, including staged investment, VC oversight
costs and agency conflicts. The contract between the VC and the EN includes risk-free and
pay-performance sensitive compensation. Moral hazard arises because the EN must exert
effort for the project to succeed. Our model is novel in that it also allows for asymmetric
beliefs about project quality due to the EN’s optimism even when the VC and EN face
symmetric information.
We first analyze the VC-EN relationship when the VC has bargaining power. We charac-
terize the equilibrium levels for the pay-performance sensitivities, investment and effort over
time and show they can be either increasing or decreasing or initially increasing and then
decreasing. We find that asymmetric beliefs and risk aversion have opposite effects on the
VC-EN relationship. When the EN is moderately more optimistic than the VC, he accepts
more risk and exerts more effort and the VC responds with more investment. In contrast,
risk aversion reduces effort and investment. Our model predicts a performance-sensitive
investment policy where critical milestones must be achieved for investment to continue.
These milestones increase with the risk aversion and decrease with the asymmetry in beliefs.
Consequently, project duration increases with asymmetric beliefs and decreases with risk
aversion.
We calibrate this core model to empirical data and use numerical analysis to demonstrate
that the technical and systematic risks have opposite effects. The VC’s payoff and the
project’s value and duration increase with technical risk and decrease with systematic risk.
We analyze the relationship when the EN has bargaining power, and find that the
equilibrium and the corresponding implications for venture financing do change. In this
setting, the negative effects due to risk aversion are more pronounced. We also find that
x
if the EN’s effort cannot be observed by the VC, then the pay-performance sensitivities,




Venture capital is the primary means through which innovative ideas are financed, nurtured
and brought to fruition and therefore plays a crucial role in economic growth. Indeed,
Gompers and Lerner (2001a) calculate that over the years “venture capitalists have created
nearly one-third of the total market value of all public companies in the United States.” The
“Venture Capitalist-Entreprenuer” (VC-EN) relationship exhibits several proven features,
each of which is essential to the understanding of VC financing. First, the process of
developing, testing and marketing an innovative idea possesses inherently high levels of
technical and systematic risks. The VC and EN have different attitudes towards risk,
since the VC is more diversified than the EN. Second, empirical evidence documents that
the VC and EN often have divergent views (“asymmetric beliefs”) about the economic
potential of the project.1 As noted in The Economist : “Entrepreneurs tend to be wildly
over-optimistic; if they were not, they would never get past their first crisis.”2 Third, several
studies document the prevalence of staged investment to mitigate the inefficiencies created
by the agency conflicts that naturally arise between the VC and EN. In the presence of
imperfect information, staged investment over time is a sensible means to avoid large capital
investments before learning more about the project’s true quality.
In this thesis, we develop, to the best of our knowledge, the first theoretical framework
of venture capital investment that incorporates the essential features of venture capital rela-
tionships in a dynamic setting—the different attitudes and components of risk, asymmetric
beliefs, agency conflicts, imperfect information and dynamic learning, staged investment.
We examine this framework under three different settings. The first, which we call the Basic
1See, for example, Sahlman (1990), Gladstone and Gladstone (2002), and Landier and Thesmar (2005).
Lerner (1998) argues that an entrepreneur’s strong sense of commitment to the firm he founded makes him
loathe to admit failure and accept the true value of the firm. Gompers and Lerner (2001b) emphasize the
prevalence of high levels of imperfect information about project qualities in venture capital financing.
2The Economist, April 16, 2005, p. 68.
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Model, assumes the VC possesses the bargaining power. In the second setting, named the
Shift of Power Model, we assume the EN holds the bargaining power. In the third model,
the Unobservable Effort Model, we assume information asymmetry between the VC and
the EN caused by the VC’s inability to observe the EN’s effort levels.
We demonstrate that the interactions between risk, asymmetric beliefs and the agency
conflicts have a major impact on the key characteristics of venture capital relationships,
namely, the economic value they generate, the structure of the long-term contracts between
VCs and entrepreneurs, how VC investment is staged over time, and the duration of VC
relationships. We examine and characterize the robustness of these results to the assumption
of bargaining power and the observability of effort. Theoretical and numerical analysis of
our framework suggests several novel testable implications for the financing, development,
and economic value of new ventures. Chief among them are:
i) VC’s have significant incentives to “feed” entrepreneur optimism and exploit it to
their advantage;
ii) the equilibrium long-term contract for the EN features either increasing or decreasing
pay-performance sensitivities; that is, the EN’s compensation will either be always
more or less sensitive to performance in earlier stages as compared with later stages;
iii) the equilibrium staged VC investments over time (contingent on continuation) will
either increase, decrease or initially increase and then subsequently decrease;
iv) firm value and the VC’s expected payoff are actually enhanced when there is greater
noise in the perception of project quality, a striking normative implication;
v) the relationship duration decreases with the project’s systematic risk but increases
with the project’s technical risk or the degree of asymmetry of beliefs;
vi) the pay-performance sensitivity and investment are lower when the EN has bargaining
power as compared to when the VC enjoys bargaining power; and
vii) the pay-performance sensitivity and investment increase when the VC cannot observe
the EN’s labor investment.
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Our framework incorporates a dynamic principal-agent model where a cash-constrained,
risk-averse entrepreneur (EN) with a project approaches a well-diversified, risk-neutral ven-
ture capitalist (VC) for financing at the initial date. The project generates potential value
through physical capital investments by the VC and human capital (effort) investments
by the EN. Both the VC and the EN have imperfect information about the project and
may, in general, differ in their initial assessments of the project’s quality with the EN being
more optimistic. The VC’s investment in the project may be staged over time. Future
investment is contingent on intermediate observations of the project’s termination value,
the fundamental state variable that represents the value of the project from the perspec-
tive of “outside” investors.3 These observations serve as “signals” that enable the VC and
the EN to update their assessments of its quality in a Bayesian manner. All payoffs occur
when the relationship is terminated.4 The EN is provided with inter-temporal incentives
to invest human capital through a long-term renegotiation-proof contract that may depend
on the entire path of the project’s termination value process. Either the VC or the EN may
terminate the relationship at any intermediate date.
Under the assumption that the EN has CARA preferences, we derive and characterize
the equilibrium long-term contract between the VC and the EN, which describes the VC’s
investments over time, the EN’s path-dependent payoff upon termination, and the inter-
temporal performance targets that must be met for the relationship to continue. Keep in
mind that the duration of the relationship (or the number of stages of financing) is en-
dogenously determined by the characteristics of the underlying project. Conditional on
continuation, the VC’s staged investments, the sensitivities of the EN’s compensation to
performance over each period (the pay-performance sensitivities), and the EN’s effort in each
period, are all deterministic functions of time. The paths of investment, pay-performance
sensitivities, and effort crucially depend on the relative magnitudes of the initial degree
3We assume the VC and the EN possess specific skills and neither is permitted to supplying them to a
third party. Hence, the termination value of the project at any date is lower than its rational expectations
market value, namely, the value of the project under hypothetical full commitment by the VC and the EN,
which incorporates the effect of their future physical and human capital investments. The termination value
of the project is observable and verifiable, but the rational expectations market value is non-verifiable.
4Our analysis could be generalized to incorporate intermediate cash flows without qualitatively altering
our main results.
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of asymmetry in beliefs about project quality and the cost of risk, which increases with
the EN’s risk aversion and the project’s total (systematic + technical) risk. If the initial
degree of asymmetry in beliefs is below a threshold relative to the cost of risk, investments,
pay-performance sensitivities, and effort increase monotonically over time. If the degree
of asymmetry in beliefs is above this threshold, however, the pay-performance sensitivities
and effort decrease monotonically over time, while the VC’s investment schedule initially
increases and subsequently decreases with time. Our theory therefore provides a poten-
tial explanation for the significant heterogeneity in contractual structures and investment
schedules reported in earlier empirical studies (for example, Gompers, 1995).
The intuition for these results, described in greater detail in the thesis, hinges on the
complex interplay among the value-enhancing effort by the EN that is positively affected
by his optimism, the costs of risk-sharing due to the EN’s risk aversion that is affected by
the project’s systematic and technical risk, and the effect of both the VC’s physical capital
investment and the EN’s effort on output. The passage of time causes technical risk to
be resolved thereby lowering the costs of risk-sharing. However, the passage of time also
lowers the degree of asymmetry in beliefs of the VC and the EN, since successive project
realizations cause the EN to revise his optimistic assessment of project quality. The decline
in the degree of asymmetry in beliefs lowers the rents that the VC can extract by exploiting
the EN’s optimism. If the initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs is below a threshold,
the beneficial effect of time on the costs of risk-sharing dominate so that the EN’s pay-
performance sensitivities and effort increase. As the EN’s effort increases over time, the
VC optimally increases her investment over time. An increase in the project’s systematic
or technical risk and/or a decrease in the degree of asymmetry in beliefs increases the costs
of risk sharing compared with the economic rents that the VC can extract from the EN’s
optimism. If the degree of asymmetry in beliefs is above a threshold, the EN is willing to
accept all the risk of the project so that his risky compensation and effort are initially high.
The negative effect of the evolution of time on the degree of asymmetry in beliefs, however,
dominates its positive effect on the costs of risk-sharing so that the EN’s risky compensation
effort declines over time. The VC’s investments initially increase to “compensate” for the
4
decrease in effort of the EN. After a certain point in time, however, the decreasing effort of
the EN makes it optimal for the VC to also lower her capital investments.
We derive the sensitivity of the equilibrium dynamics to the project’s systematic and
technical risk and the degree of asymmetry in beliefs. The EN’s pay-performance sensitiv-
ities decline with risk and increase with the degree of asymmetry in beliefs. The effects of
risk and the degree of asymmetry in beliefs on the VC’s investment path, however, depend
on their relative magnitudes. If the initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs is below a thresh-
old relative to the cost of risk, the VC’s investments decrease with systematic and technical
risk and increase with the degree of asymmetry in beliefs. If the degree of asymmetry in
beliefs is above a threshold relative to the cost of risk, however, the VC’s investments ac-
tually increase with risk in early periods and decrease in later periods, whereas the VC’s
investments actually decrease with the degree of asymmetry in beliefs in early periods and
increase in later periods.
With respect to the duration of the relationship, we demonstrate that it increases with
the degree of asymmetry in beliefs and decreases with the EN’s risk aversion. An increase
in the degree of asymmetry in beliefs and/or a decrease in the EN’s risk aversion raises the
economic rents that the VC captures due to the EN’s optimism relative to the costs of risk-
sharing, thereby inducing her to prolong the relationship. The negative relation between
duration and the degree of asymmetry in beliefs is consistent with the evidence in Kaplan
and Stromberg (2003) that experienced entrepreneurs, who are likely to have more realistic
beliefs, receive fewer rounds of financing.
We numerically implement and calibrate the parameters of our structural model to
empirical evidence on venture capital financing. We demonstrate that our model does
reasonably well in matching data on the durations of venture capital relationships and the
distributions of returns from venture capital investment reported by Sahlman (1990) and
Gompers (1995). We then analyze the calibrated model and numerically derive the effects
of the degree of asymmetry of beliefs, the project’s technical and systematic risk and the
project’s output elasticity of capital on the duration, firm value and VC’s expected payoff.
Consistent with our earlier analytical results, EN optimism significantly enhances firm
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value as well as the expected payoff to the VC.5 The increase in the VC’s expected payoff
due to EN optimism is generally disproportionately greater than the increase in firm value,
which reflects the substantial rents that the VC may extract by “feeding” EN optimism.
The positive effects of EN optimism are consistent with the empirical evidence reported
in Gelderen, Thurik and Bosma (2005). We also find that firm value is positively related
to the duration of the relationship, which is also consistent with the evidence in Gompers
(1995).
We demonstrate analytically for a two-period model and numerically for the general
model that systematic and technical risk have dramatically opposite effects on duration, firm
value, and the VC’s expected payoff. All three output variables generally increase with the
project’s initial technical risk, but decrease with its systematic risk. The intuition for these
results hinges on a subtle interplay between the effects of technical and systematic risk on
the “speed of learning” about project quality, and the mean and variance of the assessments
of project quality, which affect the VC’s “option value” of continuing the relationship. An
increase in the initial technical risk increases the variance of the distribution of project
quality assessments, since assessments are more responsive to signals due to higher signal
to noise ratios. Hence, the likelihood of “high” realizations of project quality assessments is
increased. In the presence of limited liability, where the VC will terminate the relationship if
it is no longer profitable for her to continue, the “option value” of continuing the relationship
at any date increases, which leads to a higher expected duration, firm value, and expected
payoff to the VC. On the other hand, an increase in the project’s systematic risk lowers the
signal to noise ratio, which generally leads to a decline in the variance of the distribution
of project quality assessments, as they are less responsive to intermediate signals. Hence,
the “option value” of continuing the relationship declines leading to a shorter expected
duration, firm value, and expected payoff to the VC.
We show that duration, firm value, and the VC’s expected payoff all decrease with
the physical capital intensity of the underlying project and increase with its human capital
5Firm value is the initial “rational expectations” market value of the firm from the perspective of the
VC.
6
intensity. With a constant returns-to-scale production technology, an increase in the human
capital intensity lowers the physical capital intensity and, therefore, increases the relative
contribution of the EN’s effort. As the EN’s human capital is the key driver of value in our
model, an increase in the marginal product of human capital increases firm value, duration,
and the VC’s expected payoff. These results also represent potentially testable implications
of our theory.
In the later models of this thesis we check the robustness of our results to some of
the assumptions made in the Basic Model. In the Shift of Power Model we assume a
competitive VC market and assume the EN enjoys the bargaining power. As a result, the
pay-performance sensitivities, capital investment and human effort decrease.
We introduce asymmetric information in the Unobservable Effort Model. We show
that when effort is unobservable, the VC will invest more and the EN will receive more
incentives to exert effort. The EN will indeed respond with higher effort levels. These
results are similar to Gibbons and Murphy (1992). In our model, the increased investment
provides additional incentive to the EN.
While the effects of agency conflicts and imperfect information have been studied in
several contexts by prior studies, theoretical literature that incorporates asymmetric beliefs
is relatively nascent. Landier and Thesmar (2005) develop a VC model with asymmetric
beliefs, but focus solely on debt financing. They show that optimistic entrepreneurs tend to
rely on short term debt rather than long term debt. Their model, however, does not allow
for investment to be staged over time and limits contracts to debt alone. Cuny and Talmor
(2005) analyze the effects of asymmetric beliefs in a VC finance model that compares the
performance of firms funded by milestone staging to those funded by investment rounds.
They find that when the EN is more optimistic than the VC, the advantages associated with
round financing are increased. Their analysis of the effects of asymmetric beliefs is, however,
of limited scope as they focus only on comparing the two types of finance mentioned above.
With respect to staging of investment, Neher (1999) shows that staging is essential to
overcome the hold-up problem. As in Neher (1999), staging arises endogenously in our
model with the number of stages also being determined endogenously. As Neher’s (1999)
7
model is fully deterministic, however, his framework cannot be used to study the effects of
risk, imperfect information, and asymmetric beliefs, which is a key focus of our study.6
Our framework shares features of dynamic principal-agent models that incorporate im-
perfect information (for example, Gibbons and Murphy, 1992, Holmstrom, 1999). Our
study, however, differs significantly from these studies in that both the VC (the principal)
and the EN (the agent) make investments (physical and human capital) over time, have
asymmetric beliefs about project quality, and the relationship is terminated endogenously.7
Our model could also be applied to study the financing of research and development. Berk,
Green and Naik (2003) develop an R&D model in which staging is exogenous. Since their
focus is on the valuation of R&D ventures, they do not incorporate agency conflicts or
asymmetric beliefs.
The plan for the rest of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide a comprehensive
literature review of recent research related to this thesis. In Chapter 3, we develop and
analyze the Basic Model. Chapter 4 presents a risk analysis of a two-period version of the
Basic Model. In Chapter 5, we describe the numerical implementation and calibration of
the model and its findings. In Chapter 6, we develop and analyze the Shift of Power Model.
In Chapter 7, we develop and analyze the Unobservable Effort Model. Chapter 8 provides
concluding remarks and some suggestions for further research. Proofs are provided in the
last section of each chapter. The code design of the numerical analysis Matlab code is
provided in the Appendix.
6Kockesen and Ozerturk (2004) argue that some sort of EN “lock-in” is essential for staged financing to
occur. Egli, Ongena and Smith (2005) argue that staging can be used to build an EN’s credit rating.
7Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) and Fluck et. al. (2005) analyze two-period models of venture capital
investment. We differ significantly from these studies in that we analyze the effects of asymmetric beliefs





Our model may be applied to a number of interrelated fields including venture finance,
managerial incentives and project R&D. In his seminal work describing the venture capital
industry, Sahlman (1990) describes three central motifs in the VC - EN relationship.
1. The inflow of capital is installed over time rather than provided upfront.
2. The contract between the VC and the EN is structured so that cashflow rights and
control rights may be separated.
3. The VC continuously monitors and oversees the project and provides valuable advice
to the EN.
Researchers employ a number of approaches to explain why these features developed (mainly
1 and 2), and how they affect the industry (mainly 3). One approach, which we do not
employ, is the real options analysis (Cossin et. al. (2002), Berger et. al. (1996), Benaroch
and Kauffman (1999) among others). Another approach, which we consider, is by means of
the principal-agent problem also known as the agency problem. The agency problem rises
from frictions and asymmetries between the VC and the EN. For example, if the VC is risk-
neutral but the EN is risk-averse, the EN’s objectives may be unaligned with the VC’s and
consequently the EN may employ investment strategies that are not optimal to the VC and
inefficient society-wise. Similarly, if the EN is able to divert funds from the firm to his private
consumption he may act in an efficient manner. Finally, agency conflicts from information
or belief asymmetries may result in the VC’s and EN’s actions colliding. Kaplan and
Stromberg (2001) provide a comprehensive review of empirical findings pertaining venture
finance and the agency problem and Hart (2001) provides a review of theoretical models.
Our review covers many of the papers in those review papers as well as other, more recent,
papers. Section 2.1 describes empirical findings in the field of venture finance and Section 2.2
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The single most important tool employed by the VC to guarantee his return is the staging
of investment (Sahlman (1990)). The life of a project is divided into stages or investment
rounds, starting from seed investments, whose sole purpose is to evaluate the project and
its prospects for success, through development and expansion stages until liquidation stages
or going to initial public offering (IPO). As the firm moves from one round to the next it
usually requires ever-increasing investment, which may be provided by the same VC. The
cost of capital to the firm, however, will decrease from round to round due to lower risks
associated with better forecasts of project earnings (Plummer (1987)).
Using data from 794 venture-backed firms Gompers (1995) finds that staging investment
enables the VC to acquire knowledge about the firm, monitor it and, if necessary, abandon
it. They find that VCs concentrate their efforts in early stage firms where informational
asymmetries between the VC and the EN are high and for which VC’s monitoring and
insight is of importance. They find that firms that are successful get more funding rounds
and receive more total investment. Further, Gompers finds that unsuccessful firms are
revealed (and discontinued) earlier and receive less funds than successful firms (success
measured by going to IPO). Our model makes similar predictions. In our model, if a firm
gets a positive signal in the first period its expected project duration (and consequently, its
expected total funding) is larger. If the same firm received a negative signal, its expected
project duration and its expected total funding decreases. We use data from Gompers
(1995) to calibrate the parameters of our model for the numerical analysis.
In our model staging is allowed and the exact number of stages is endogenously derived.
The capital investment in each period is set endogenously, and we are able to characterize
when investment is increasing or decreasing or non-monotonic over time. Sahlman (1990)
reports that there is typically up to eight different stages. In the numerical analysis, we
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find that the probability for more than eight stages is negligible. Our model’s prediction
that experienced entrepreneurs, who possess a more realistic belief about the firm’s quality
(small asymmetry in beliefs), will be funded in fewer rounds is supported by Kaplan and
Stromberg (2003).
2.1.2 Contract structure
Sahlman (1990) reports that the VC-EN contract is a stock purchase agreement in which
the VC guarantees capital at a certain schedule for which he receives some form of stock
and other rights. Typically, the stock will be in a form of convertible preferred stock and
the contract specifies the exact terms of the stock including conversion price, liquidation
schemes and dividend terms. Other rights include (i) the “right of first refusal” in which the
insider VC is given priority over outside investors in participation in new investments in the
firm, (ii) information rights providing independent access to all information concerning the
progress of the firm, and (iii) voting and control rights. The VC-EN contract also typically
includes a number of restrictions on the EN such as a “no compete clause” that prevents
the EN from working in the same industry for a period of time should he leave the firm.
Finally, the contract specifies vesting schedules on the EN’s equity share, and the VC’s
rights to buy-back those shares in case of the EN’s early resignation.
In their survey of 213 VC investments, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) find the structure
of the contracts is carefully designed to mitigate known problems such as the aforementioned
principal-agent problem and the hold-up problem. The hold-up problem stems from the lack
of the legal means to enforce EN commitment to the project. This problem is most severe
when the entrepreneur is critical to firm success. With respect to the agency problem,
they find that the VC-EN contract is designed to separate the allocation of cash flow
rights, control rights and liquidation rights so that if the project performs poorly, the VC
is able to independently increase his control and liquidation rights, whereas if the project’s
performance is quite positive, the VC can reduce those rights while retaining his cash flow
rights.
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Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find empirical evidence that the EN’s contingent compen-
sation is increasing over time. In their theoretical model, which we discuss in length in
Section 2.2.2, the EN can signal to the market about his ability. They show that this sig-
naling is very strong in the early years of the EN’s career (high career concerns) and is
minimal in later years. Accordingly, the EN’s contingent compensation is increasing over
the years as his incentives shift from career concerns to immediate consumption concerns.
Our model predicts that when the EN is risk averse and the asymmetry in beliefs is
sufficiently small, the contingent compensation is increasing over time. This result is robust
to small changes in the initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs, who has the bargaining power
(EN or VC) and whether effort is observable or not. Our assumption with regard to the
EN’s right to repudiation is supported by the fact that the VC must devise different schemes
to ensure EN’s long-term participation in the project.
2.1.3 VC Oversight
VC monitoring and oversight is another central theme in VC finance, and is considered essen-
tial for firm success. The purpose of this oversight is multi-fold. In contrast to “arms-length
funding”, where the EN is not monitored by the financier, VC finance is a “relationship
funding”, and the EN not only receives the necessary capital but also critical advice, busi-
ness ties and managerial support. Sahlman (1990) claims this is an essential advantage to
the VC-EN relationship. Sahlman also reports that by monitoring firm performance the
VC is able to avoid further investment if progress is not satisfactory. Indeed, Lerner (1995)
finds that VC oversight increases during CEO change, a “sensitive” time in a project’s life.
Oversight, however, does not come without cost, as reported by Sahlman (1990) and
Kaplan and Stromberg (2004). While Sahlman does not give an estimate to the actual
cost of this oversight, he reports that VC fund managers usually receive a managerial fee
that is on average 2.5% of the capital invested by the fund, and that only few VC fund
managers were paid according to the portfolio value. However, this does not represent the
true costs of oversight because in addition to the mentioned VC management fee these VC
fund managers receive at least 20% of profits (Gompers and Lerner (1999)). According to
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Sahlman, the VC’s way of financing the oversight costs is through the required expected
rate of return, which is relatively high in comparison to other forms of funding. This,
Sahlman explains, is due to the additional monitoring and oversight costs, and due to the
“well-known bias in financial projections made by entrepreneurs” (p. 512). Lerner (1995)
finds that companies physically nearer to the VC are more likely to be chosen for funding
due to the reduced oversight costs.
Another consequence of the VC oversight is the choice of projects to be funded. In
Hellmann and Puri (2000), candidate projects are labeled as either innovative or imitat-
ing. Innovative projects develop a new technology or non-existent service, while imitat-
ing projects continue already established products or services. They find that innovative
projects are more likely to be financed by VC’s than imitating projects, which they claim is
due to the greater advantage oversight offers with innovative projects. They also find that
for innovative projects VC financing is associated with a reduction of the time to bring the
product to market. In another paper, Hellmann and Puri (2002) find yet another effect of
the VC’s oversight. They report that firms funded by VC’s are more likely to hire marketing
vice presidents, develop human resource policies and other professional measures than firms
financed by other means.
We assume the VC considers oversight costs when investing in a firm. This corresponds
to the empirical reports that find that these costs are substantial, and specifically to Lerner
(1998), who reports evidence to strong VC consideration of oversight costs. In our model,
we assume that the VC’s cost of monitoring is exogenous and aggregate it with depreciation
costs and losses to competition.
2.1.4 Bargaining Power
Baker and Gompers (2003) study 1,116 firms of which a third are backed by venture cap-
italists. They report that tenured CEO’s have greater bargaining power and are able to
increase the number of insiders sitting in the board. However, VC finance decreases the
CEO’s power, and they find that the influence of the EN (i.e. his bargaining power) is
decreasing with the VC reputation. They explain this last result by assuming that a more
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reputable VC gains bargaining power since he has better contacts to find suitable replace-
ment for the EN. Consequently, they turn to check the rate of CEO turnover and find it is
increasing with the VC’s reputation.
Using valuation data for 4069 firms, Gompers and Lerner (2000) find that in periods
with greater amounts of capital available in venture funds, the evaluations of venture firms
increase. This implies that in times when less venture money is available the VC gets more
for his money, effectively implying the VC’s bargaining power is decreasing at times of
abundant venture capital.
We test our model when the VC has bargaining power and when the EN has bargain-
ing power. We find that when the EN has bargaining power he will have less contingent
compensation.
2.1.5 Risk Analysis
Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) conduct a study of 67 portfolio investments in which they
classify investment risks and uncertainties into one of the following three categories:
1. Internal Risks — risks that are associated with asymmetries between the VC and the
EN (agency conflict risks). These risks may include the EN’s ability, his willingness
to exert effort, insider’s information about the project, etc.
2. External Risks — risks that are equally uncertain for the VC and the EN, such as
market condition, competition, etc.
3. Complexity Risks — risks that are equally uncertain to the VC and the EN but that
are partly under the control of the EN. Success of developing a product or executing
management strategy are examples for complexity risk.
Kaplan and Stromberg find that internal risks are associated with more VC control, more
contingent investment in a given round and more contingent compensation to the EN.
External risks are associated with more VC liquidation rights, in contrast to the theoretical
view of optimal risk sharing between the risk neutral VC and the risk averse EN. Complexity
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risks are associated with more vesting of the EN’s compensation, which corresponds to
mitigating hold-up problems.
Gompers and Lerner (2001b) describe why little is known about the risk of early stage
venture funded firms. VCs avoid pricing their firms until they go public and use the firm’s
book value as the firm’s value prior to IPO. Thus, when many firms go public there is an
upwards bias in the returns of venture firms, when in fact many of the gains reported in
the IPO year were realized in the years proceeding the IPO. They stress the importance of
learning about the risk involved with venture capital due to the fact more and more public
institutions allocate ever increasing fractions of their portfolios in this market.
Our model tackles issues related to the risk of venture firms. In a two-period model
we demonstrate analytically many results with respect to risk effects on venture duration




Neher (1999) provides a theoretical framework to show that staging is essential to overcome
the hold-up problem. In this model, the investments made by the VC can be materialized
into salvageable physical assets only upon completion of an investment period. If the EN
decides to abandon the project during a period, then all the current period’s investment is
lost. Therefore, if the venture capitalist provides the whole required investment upfront,
the entrepreneur can, prior to completion, force renegotiation on the VC. At this point
the VC has already put in all the money required and therefore has no bargaining power.
Thus, renegotiation will always result in the VC incurring losses, and therefore no VC will
ever finance such a project in the first place. By staging investment, the VC can build
collateral to his prior investments and give him bargaining power in case of renegotiation.
In early investment periods, the VC’s bargaining power stems from the fact that he has
not yet invested much, whereas in later periods he has already built a physical collateral
to preempt renegotiation. In this manner, the VC can assure his bargaining power at any
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given time in the project’s life, thus enabling him to get his required rate of return.
Our model is similar to Neher (1999) in the sense that we too see staging as a technique
to overcome inefficiency due to the agency problem. The aspect of the agency problem that
our staging overcomes is not the commitment problem that Neher addresses, but rather the
inefficiency due to the EN’s risk-aversion and the effort he must invest in the project (Neher’s
model is fully deterministic and so the issue of risk-aversion does not rise). The friction that
rises as result of the EN’s effort is commonly called a moral hazard problem and results in
the EN considering not only the firm’s value but also his effort level. Consequently, the EN’s
objectives are different from the VC’s objectives that emphasize only firm’s value. Another
difference between our model and Neher’s is in the compensation to the EN. Neher assumes
that if the EN repudiates prior to project completion he receives no income, whereas in
our model if the EN repudiates he receives his previously committed share of the project
value. Both models, however, share the notion that a project accumulates value through
investment even prior to its completion.
Another explanation for staging is provided by Kockesen and Ozerturk (2004), who find
that some sort of EN lock-in is required for staged financing to occur. The reason is that
following the VC’s initial investment, the EN can opt out and seek finance from another VC.
In this case, the first VC gets zero return for his investment and therefore no VC will want
to make the initial investment. However, if the EN can be locked into the initial VC, VC
finance may be feasible; even more so, it may be more attractive than “upfront finance” in
which the entire investment is made at the beginning. A natural lock-in is an “information
lock-in”. This happens when a signal indicating the success of the project is received after
some initial investment is made. This signal can be observed only by the EN and the initial
VC, and therefore if the signal indicates success the EN will prefer staying with the original
VC, because any alternative VC is unaware of the project’s promise, and will therefore
make a less appealing offer to the EN. This lock-in results in the EN having less bargaining
power over the VC and hence, the VC can extract surplus when writing the second period
contract. Another consequence is that the EN will overinvest in the initial period before
information is revealed. This extra level of investment can be viewed as the cost to the
16
VC to be an insider in the project. The added value to the VC enables him to invest even
when the project is rejected from an “upfront finance” point of view. In such cases, or
when an upfront investor barely brakes even, the EN will prefer to share surplus with a
more willing “relationship” financier. When informational lock-in is technically impossible,
Kockesen and Ozerturk find that it is necessary for the EN to lock himself into the VC by
adding a clause to the initial agreement that prevents him from seeking alternative sources
of finance.
In our model we do not allow informational lock-in to arise. We assume the EN can
effortlessly convey to any prospect investor the traits of the project and that due to com-
petitiveness in the VC market, all VC’s will make similar lending offers. The “right of
first refusal”, reported by Sahlman (1990), justifies our assumption that the same VC will
continue in consecutive rounds. In addition, when our model assumes the VC market is
competitive and the EN has bargaining power, the terms in which the VC will continue to
invest must be identical to the terms in which any other VC would invest. Therefore, even
without maintaining informational lock-in or a non-compete clause, we are able to explain
why the same VC will invest in consecutive stages.
Egli, Ongena and Smith (2005) provide another advantage to staging investments. They
describe a world where there are two types of ENs. The first chooses never to default
on a loan and the second defaults whenever it is profitable for him to do so. In these
circumstances, they show that the EN may prefer to have the investment staged over time
so that the EN can build his “credit worthiness” reputation, and therefore increase his
access to inexpensive capital. Their model also helps explain why it is common for the
EN to seek capital from the same VC in consecutive rounds. Once the EN is able to build
positive credit reputation with the initial VC he will prefer to stay with him since he receives
better financing conditions. Their model can also explain why VC’s require a decreasing
rate of return between rounds (Plummer (1980)). The VC is assuming less risk due to the
increasing EN credit worthiness.
At the heart of Egli, Ongena and Smith (2005) lies the assumption that an EN may
prefer to repay a loan even when he is permitted to default. In our model, we make a
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similar assumption by assuming that the EN does not default on his monetary agreement.
To make this assumption less objectionable, we point out that in our model we assume firm
value grows positively in such a way that the probability the EN might find it beneficial to
default is negligible. Reputation concerns similar to those raised by Egli et. al. may further
serve to remove objection to this assumption.
2.2.1.1 Contract structure
The moral hazard problem, mentioned above, may be caused by a different reason than
the EN’s distaste with effort. For example, moral hazard may arise when the EN receives
private benefits from the firm. These private benefits, pecuniary or not, may induce the
EN to practice business policies that are not optimal to either the VC (whose objective is
maximizing firm value) or society (whose objective is maximizing benefits to both parties).
One approach to address this issue is the incomplete contracts approach (Hart and Moore
(1988), Aghion and Bolton (1992) among others). This approach assumes that many actions
the EN takes are unobservable or unverifiable and thus non contractible. Further, there may
be many cases in which unforseen events happen under which it is unclear what actions
should be taken. Accordingly, an important purpose of the contract is to state who takes
control of the firm rather than just what actions should be taken. Following this approach,
Aghion and Bolton (1992) show that due to moral hazard, the contract written between the
VC and EN will include not only monetary remunerations but also, independently, allocation
of control rights. They find that when efficiency (i.e. maximizing social surplus) emphasizes
maximizing firm value then control should be transferred to the VC. In contrast, when the
private benefits are significant, then maximizing firm value results in losses in social surplus
and therefore control should be shifted to the EN. Hart (2001) extends a simple version of
Aghion and Bolton’s model to explain shifts of control between different types of investors
such as creditors and shareholders (VCs).
In contrast to Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart (2001), Kirilenko (2001) allows control
to be divided continuously between the VC and the EN. In Kirilenko’s model the VC faces
an EN that enjoys nonpecuniary benefits from the firm whose value are known only to the
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EN. Kirilenko shows that the VC requires disproportionately higher control rights than his
equity size, and that the VC’s control rights grow with the severity of the agency conflict.
The reward to the EN for the loss of control is the ability to get better terms of financing,
and to shift some of the risk to the VC. Without the possibility to separate control rights
from equity holdings, investment will not take place in the first place.
Trester (1998) shows that the popularity of preferred equity contracts over debt contracts
in venture finance projects is due to asymmetric information between the VC and the EN.
His model predicts that if auditing were inexpensive and feasible then debt contracts would
be optimal. His analysis is somewhat limited in comparison to our model because he assumes
that the EN is risk-neutral and he does not consider contracts of a mixed nature. Indeed,
Trester conjectures that if risk-averseness is introduced then mixed debt-equity contracts
may be optimal. In our model, we find evidence that increased risk-averseness results in
less contingent compensation.
Control is also in the core of Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990), who consider a two-period
model in which the EN is replaceable. The EN’s skill is unknown upfront but both parties
share the same beliefs about it. In the first period, the VC invests an initial amount. The
output at the end of the first period depends on the amount of effort the EN exerts. At the
end of the first period the EN’s true skill is revealed to both parties and the VC can decide
whether to take over the control of the firm or leave it by the EN. At the end of the second
period a second and final cash flow is received, which is shared according to the division
rule set a date zero. Chan et. al. consider renegotiation proof contracts, which specify the
monetary compensation and the second period control decision as a function of the firm’s
output and the EN’s skill. Chan et. al. explain why the EN is prohibited from seeking
alternative sources of finance (in the second period). This result also corresponds to the
prevalence of no-compete clauses. In addition, they find that the VC takes control of the
firm if the EN’s revealed skill is lower than a critical value. In this case, the VC will pay
the EN a fixed amount. This result explains why a VC may retain the option to buy out
the EN’s shares. In contrast, when the EN stays in control his compensation is increasing
with his skill.
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Admati and Pfleinderer (1994) explain that absent an insider VC with precise knowledge
of the firm overinvesting will occur. This happens because when uniformed outside investors
provide the funding, the decision maker EN has incentive to continue that project even when
it is optimal to abandon it. On the other hand, having an insider investor who is not the sole
owner may lead to underinvesting for a number of reasons, mainly, due to the EN getting
some of the surplus for which the VC has invested. Admati and Pfleinderer show that the
optimal contract is a fixed-fraction contact. Under this contract the insider VC does not
increase nor decrease his share in subsequent financing rounds. They show the fixed fraction
contract is robust in the sense that it is optimal for any probability distribution of the firm’s
output. This type of contract explains why in later rounds investors other than the initial
VC invest in the firm. It also suggests that the insider VC should be chosen to set the price
of newly issued securities in future rounds. This is because the VC retains a fixed fraction
of the total securities and consequently has no incentive to misprice them, whereas the EN
will gain if they are overpriced and the new investors will tend to underprice.
Fluck, Garrison and Myers (2005) show that when EN effort is determined endogenously,
the fixed fraction contract is not optimal. This happens because in the event the VC has a
fixed fraction contract he still has the incentive to overprice the firm since by overpricing the
EN share’s value the EN is induced to work harder. Consequently, outsider investors cannot
trust the insider VC’s information and inefficiency occurs. They find that in some cases by
increasing the insider VC’s share the VC will lose the incentive to misprice newly issued
securities. The Fluck et. al. model assumes two investment periods in which investment
is set exogenously. The results of their analysis, which is purely numerical, indicate that
underinvesting is a severe problem. However, their focus is mostly on corporate structure
rather than optimal investment levels and they do not consider important aspects of the




One of the most important tools the VC employs to overcome the agency problem is giving
incentives to the EN to act according to the VC’s objectives. The typical example is when
the EN must exert effort to increase firm value, but this effort comes to the EN at some
cost. The question of what are the optimal incentive scheme is addressed in the literature
of managerial incentives (see Holmstrom (1999), Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa (1986)) and
is very much related to the field of venture finance since the EN is usually in the managerial
position and the VC is the firm’s board of director.
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) develop a model for optimal managerial incentives. The
purpose of managerial incentives is to persuade managers to behave according to what
is optimal for the firm. These incentives are required because optimal behavior requires
the manager to exert effort, something he may be reluctant to do. On the other hand, if
the manager’s concerns are to build his reputation to attract future employers to him, also
named “career concerns”, he will invest more than the optimal amount. Recall, it is typically
assumed the effort by the EN is either unobservable or unverifiable and, therefore, non-
contractible. Therefore, an ideal incentive scheme will link the manager’s income directly
with his abilities in a manner that results in the EN himself choosing the optimal effort
level. However, since the EN’s ability is also unknown the scheme ties the manager’s
compensation with other contractible measures that are good proxies to the EN’s ability,
such as the the firm’s performance or output. When the VC cannot observe the effort by the
EN, information asymmetry develops between the VC and the EN with regard to the EN’s
ability. Models such as Holmstorm (1979), Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Bergemann
and Hege (1998) employ this scheme of learning about the effort and ability indirectly by
observing output. The model we develop is an extension of Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
We therefore present this model in more detail.
Gibbons and Murphy consider a T period model where in each period t the firm’s output
is
yt = η + at + εt,
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where at is the manager’s effort, εt, is a noise signal and η is the manager’s ability. There
is symmetric information about εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε ). Before the first period there is symmetric
information about the manager’s ability which is assumed by both parties η ∼ N(m0, σ20).
However, since the manager’s effort can not be observed by the firm owner, informational
asymmetries develop in consequent periods. The manager has disutility from effort mea-
sured by g(at) and his utility from consumption and effort is given by:










Following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), Gibbons and Murphy assume the contract
between the firm owner and the manager is a short term linear contract given by
ct + btyt
for each period t. Due to competition between firm owners the firm owner gains zero
expected return. In the first period, after the parties have chosen the optimal contract, the
manager chooses his optimal effort level. After both parties observe the firm’s output they
each update their estimate of the manager’s ability according to Bayesian updating. Since
the firm owner cannot observe the manager’s actual level effort he makes a conjecture about
the effort level the manager exerted and updates his beliefs with regard to the manager’s
ability according to this conjecture, â1. Since the prior distribution of η is normal, so is the
posterior distribution and the volatility is agreed upon by the firm owner and the manager
at each period.
In what follows, we describe the equilibrium results of a simplified two-period model of
Gibbons and Murphy (1992). In the second period, the manager’s optimal effort decision
a∗2(b2) satisfies g
′(a2) = b2. Competition between firm owners dictates
c2(b2) = (1− b2)E[y2|y1].
Substituting this into the manager’s utility results with an optimal slope, b∗2, that satisfies
b2 =
1




where σ21 is the posterior variance of η. Since, by assumption, g
′′(a) is positive it follows that
b∗2 < 1. In the first period, since the manager knows he can affect the firm owner’s future
estimate of η through his unobservable exerted effort, the manager’s optimal effort does not
depend on this period alone but also on optimal decisions in the last period. Consequently,
Gibbons and Murphy show the optimal effort, a∗1(b1), that satisfies




The total incentive to the manager in the first period, B1, is obtained from the contingent







optimal slope, b∗1, satisfies
b1 =
1




















2, namely, the compensation slopes are increasing from
the first period to the second. In fact, Gibbons and Murphy show that this statement is
true in a general T period model, i.e., the contractual incentives, b∗t , increase over time.
The reason for this is that in early periods the manager’s career concerns are greater than
his concern for current wages, whereas towards the end of his career the manager is mostly
interested in his wages and his leisure. By gradually increasing the part of the contract
tied with performance, the firm can suppress the tendency to over-invest in earlier periods,
and induce the manager to invest more than he would have otherwise in later periods of his
career.
We adapt the model introduced by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) to address venture-
financed projects. While we adopt the treatment of contracting, risk-averseness, effort and
learning, we differ from their model in a number of meaningful ways by introducing three
important features of venture capital. First, we introduce investment by the VC and allow
it to be derived endogenously. Second, we allow for losses due to VC oversight and value
depreciation. Third, we introduce asymmetric beliefs between the VC and the EN.
Baker and Hall (2004) examine the relationship between firm size and CEO incentives.
There are two natural ways to measure the strength of CEO incentives: (i) the change in
CEO wealth relative to a dollar change in the firm’s value or (ii) the absolute value of the
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CEO’s wealth. They find that according to the first measure the compensation to CEO’s
in small firms is extremely large as compared to CEO’s in large firms. However, according
to the second measure the results are opposite. To reconcile these results they develop a
new measure for the strength of CEO incentives. In their model they assume a marginal
product of the manager’s effort, γ. That is, they assume that every unit of manager effort
contributes only γ < 1 units to increase firm value. Baker and Hall’s approach is novel in
the fact that they assume the marginal productivity (γ) depends on firm size, and consider
the elasticity of the marginal productivity to firm size as a critical factor in determining
the strength of the CEO’s incentive. They measure the incentive’s strength as the CEO’s
sensitivity pay to performance multiplied by his marginal productivity. Using data from
1749 firms they find that while the sensitivity pay to performance sharply declines with firm
size, the incentive’s strength measure is roughly constant with firm size. In the context of
our model, however, they find that the manager’s marginal productivity increases with firm
size. This empirical evidence resonates well with the numerical analysis of our model in
which we find that increasing the EN’s output elasticity of effort increases the firm’s value.
Simply put, our model also predicts that firms with higher output elasticity of effort will
be of larger size.
2.2.3 Asymmetric Information and Beliefs
Many of the models discussed above contain some form of informational asymmetry between
the EN and the VC to incorporate this feature observed in the VC industry. This asymmetry
is either between the VC and the EN (Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Trester(1998)) or
between insider and outsider VC’s (Admati and Pfleinderer (1994) Fluck et. al. (2005),
Kockesen and Ozerturk (2004)) or between them all (Egli et. al. 2005). In our model, we
do not consider asymmetries between prospective investors but only between VC and the
EN. Our contribution to the understanding of the effects of asymmetry is that we allow for
asymmetry in beliefs. In the basic model we only consider asymmetry in belief between the
EN and the VC. In the unobservable model, we also allow for asymmetries in information
to develop because of the unobservability of effort.
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Our motivation to introduce asymmetry in beliefs is the extensive empirical evidence
to support it. Sahlman (1990) and Gladstone and Gladstone (2002) report that even in
face of the same information, managers and owners have differences in opinion. The EN
will almost always have a more positive view with regard to the venture’s success. To
quote Palich and Bagby (1995): “In other words entrepreneurs are more likely to see the
business world through ‘rose colored glasses’ ”. When extreme, this optimism leads the EN
to irrational beliefs or to seem risk tolerant (Cave and Minty (2004)). Indeed, in our model,
we assume the VC’s beliefs are the “true beliefs”, and if the EN is more optimistic than the
VC, he is unrealistic. Lerner (1998) provide additional insight to understanding a cause for
EN’s unrealistic optimism. Strong EN commitment to the firm he founded and the lack to
admit failure prevents him from conceding to the true (and low) value of the firm.
The importance of beliefs cannot be underestimated. Gelderen, Thurik and Bosma
(2005) follow 517 nascent entrepreneurs (i.e. EN’s with active manifested desire to start a
business before actually starting it) over a period of three years and examine their success.
They find that the perceived risk of the market is negatively tied with EN success. They
also find a strong positive relationship between the EN’s ambition to succeed. Assuming a
strong correlation between ambition and optimism, Gelderen, Thurik and Bosma support
our findings of the positive effects of EN’s optimism.
Asymmetry in beliefs between the VC and the EN is comprehensively reported by
Landier and Thesmar (2005). They start by explaining the source of such asymmetry
and confirm that ENs tend to be more optimistic than the investors. Their model focuses
on debt contracts to show that optimistic entrepreneurs tend to rely on short term debt
rather than long term debt. The early maturity of debt enables the investor to take control
of the project in case the project is unsuccessfully managed. They continue to back their
results with empirical data from the French industry, which heavily relies on debt finance.
The significance of Landier and Thesmar (2005) to our model lies more in the theoretical
support to the existence of asymmetry in beliefs even when the VC and the EN face iden-
tical information. With regard to venture finance, however, their model limits contracts to
debt alone and investment is not staged. Nevertheless, their results may be interpreted to
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support the conclusions of our model. For example, the fact that optimistic ENs receive
short term debt is interpreted as a means for the VC to allocate control when downside
information on the project is revealed. Indeed, our model suggests that the contingent
compensation of an optimistic EN is decreasing with time due to the arriving information.
In our model, this decrease is the sum of two forces, one resulting from the decrease in risk
and the second due to the decrease in the EN’s optimism.
Cuny and Talmor (2005) analyze the effects of asymmetric beliefs in a VC finance
model that compares the performance of firms funded by milestone staging to those funded
by investment rounds. In milestone staging further investment is guaranteed to the EN if a
milestone is reached, whereas in investment rounds finance, the firm is given no guarantee
that further investments will be given. They find that when the EN is more optimistic than
the VC, the advantages associated with round financing are increased. Their analysis of the
effects of asymmetric beliefs is of limited scope as they focus only on comparing the two
types of finance mentioned above.
Bigus (2003) develops a single period, three states of the world model that incorporates
asymmetric beliefs between the VC and the EN with respect to the project’s mean value
and riskiness. The VC is more pessimistic than the EN and assumes the project’s payoff
has a lower mean and higher volatility. Bigus introduces a moral hazard problem in the
form of an EN who is able to consume perks, an action that negatively affects the firm’s
return. He then examines the optimal contract under different cases: with or without perk
consumption and for different cases of asymmetries in beliefs. His model predicts that VC’s
equity increases with the asymmetry in beliefs with regard to risk and that the debt level
increases with the asymmetry in beliefs with regard to the mean of the project’s return.
The focus of Bigus (2003) is on the structure of the optimal contracts in face of asymme-
tries in beliefs. He does not incorporate staged investment or even learning, two ingredients
that seem only natural in the context of venture capital and asymmetries between the VC
and the EN. Moreover, since his analysis is limited to a three state model with many re-
strictive assumptions, many questions are raised with regard to the robustness of the results
to changes in these assumptions.
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Surprisingly, there is very little venture finance literature, empirical or theoretical, ded-
icated to understanding the effects of asymmetry in beliefs. In this context the model we
develop is a step towards a comprehensive approach towards understanding theses effects.
2.2.4 VC Oversight
The moral hazard problem can be extended to a two-sided problem where both the EN and
the VC need to exert effort for the project to succeed. This problem, also known as a double
sided moral hazard, is used in Repullo and Suarez (2004) and Inderst and Muller (2004) to
model the need of the VC to offer advice and the EN to exert effort. These models assume
both the EN and the VC have disutility from the effort and advice they have to exert. In
our modeling of the VC’s problem, we choose a slightly different course: We acknowledge
the importance of the VC’s effort but we do not view it in the context of a moral hazard.
Instead, we aggregate it as an exogenous loss cost.
Another paper that considers the significance of oversight is Allen and Gale (1999). They
compare the efficiency of financial markets and financial intermediaries in face of asymmetry
in beliefs of investors. In the financial markets each investor monitors the firm closely and is
well informed of the details of the investment and has full control on the decision to invest.
By using intermediaries, however, investors have limited access to information and rely on
the manager of the investment fund to make the investment decision. Allen and Gale show
the advantage of financial markets over financial intermediaries increases with the diversity
of the investors. Since the focus of Allen and Gale is with regard to the optimal financial
method they put little attention on the investment process itself and their model does not
involve staged investment. In addition, they focus on asymmetry within investor groups
and not between the investor and the entrepreneur.
The intermediaries in Allen and Gale (1999) are close in spirit to the 3-Tier modeling
of venture capital, described as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Dessi (2005). This
modeling separates the investors in the venture capital fund from the VC who manages this
fund, and the EN. This three-tier hierarchy of venture finance (investor - fund manager -
EN) is similar to the double sided moral hazard, considered above, since the investors in
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the venture capital fund need both the VC (fund manager) and the EN to exert effort.
2.2.5 Bargaining Power
Many of the theoretical models assume the VC industry is competitive, thus assuming the
VC has no bargaining power. One exception is Inderst and Muller (2004), who develop a
model that incorporates the possibility of bargaining power being shared between the VC
and the EN and who predict that bargaining power affects the valuation of firms. Their
model, however, does not consider staged investment and agents are risk neutral. Although
we do not allow for bargaining power to be shared we examine the effects of shifting the
bargaining power between the EN and the VC, and find the EN’s contingent compensation
decreases when the EN has bargaining power.
2.2.6 Risk Analysis
The staged evolution of the project is an important feature common to venture finance
models and R&D models. Indeed, many papers labeled as venture finance can readily be
applied to the field of R&D; see, for example, the concluding remarks in Wang and Zhou
(2004). Berk, Green and Naik (2003) develop an R&D model in which staging is exogenously
given. In their model, which addresses project valuation and the cost of risk, a project must
complete N successful stages in order to begin producing a cash flow. This cash flow behaves
according to a standard geometric Brownian motion and is the sole source of systematic
risk in their model. Their model has several sources of idiosyncratic risks including risk of
obsolescence, the technical risk pertaining to the success of an investment round, and the
duration and the total cost of the project. Investment is necessary but not a guarantee for
the project to move to the next stage. In fact, the probability for success is updated from
one investment round to the other through the history of the project. The investment made
in each investment round is a linear function of the projected cash flow. As part of their
risk analysis, Berk et. al. compare the risk premium required for a non-venture project
(one with completed R&D) to the risk premium required for a venture project when both
projects share the same cash flow projection. Since idiosyncratic risk can be diversified,
they argue that traditional analysis should result in equal risk premium for both projects.
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However, they demonstrate this is not the case and that “required risk premium for the
R&D (project) is higher than it would be were the R&D (project) complete and the venture
a traditional, cash producing project” (p. 2). This, they claim, is a result of the fact that
while pure idiosyncratic risk can be diversified, the decision to continue an R&D project
involves the resolution of both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Thus, the project behaves
similarly to a compound option on systematic uncertainty, which bears higher systematic
risk than the underlying asset.
Since Berk, Green and Naik (2003) develops an R&D model they do not consider agency
conflict but rather consider a single entity that manages and finances the project. This
analysis is more suitable for large corporations who have their own R&D management but
less so for the standard VC-EN venture projects. We share Berk, Green and Naik’s notion
of separating between different sources of risk. They find that projects that perform poorly
are abandoned early in their development stage. We reach a similar result, if in a slightly
different context. In our model, all projects are terminated, rather than either completed
or abandoned, and we too find that poor performing projects will have a shorter project
duration.
An alternative approach to the handling of risk can be found in Guo and Yang (2005),
who propose that the risk of a project is not exogenous but rather can be managed by the EN
and the VC. In their model, the managers (EN) optimize their utility by controlling for the
mean and the risk. When risk is determined exogenously they find a negative relationship
between risk and the contingent compensation to the EN and that effort increases with
the contingent compensation. However, when allowing risk to be determined endogenously,
these standard results do not necessarily hold.
Guo and Yang (2005) presents a single period model and they do not consider invest-
ment. However, their model is very exciting in the sense that it considers managing the






We consider an infinite time horizon with discrete dates 0, 1, 2, 3, ... that are assumed to be
equally spaced for convenience. Period i, i ≥ 1 refers to the time interval [i−1, i). At date 0,
a cash-constrained entrepreneur (EN) with a project approaches a venture capitalist (VC)
for funding. The project can potentially generate value through physical capital investments
by the VC and human capital (effort) investments by the EN. Both the VC and the EN have
imperfect information about the project and differ, in general, in their initial assessments
of the project’s quality.
If the VC agrees to invest in the project, she offers the EN a long-term contract that
describes her investments in the project over time, and the EN’s compensation. Investments
by the VC (if they occur) are made at the beginning of each period. Either the VC or the
EN could terminate the relationship at any date and could also initiate a renegotiation of
their contract, that is, there is two-sided lack of commitment. In equilibrium, therefore, the
contract between the VC and the EN is renegotiation-proof. We assume the VC possesses
all the bargaining power in any negotiation with the EN. We show, however, that in order
to provide appropriate inter-temporal incentives to the EN, the EN’s reservation payoff at
any date, that is, his promised payoff if the VC-EN relationship were terminated, varies
over time. Since the VC possesses all the bargaining power in negotiations with the EN, in
equilibrium termination occurs at the VC’s behest.
The fundamental state variable is the market value Vi of the project if the VC-EN
relationship is terminated at date i. This is the value of the claim to future earnings from
the project outside the VC-EN relationship, that is, from the perspective of outside investors
at date i. Therefore, Vi is the total payoff to the VC and the EN if their relationship is
terminated at date i. We assume that both the VC and the EN possess project-specific
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skills that are not transferrable. Neither the VC nor the EN can commit to supplying these
skills to a third party. Hence, the amount outside investors would be willing to pay for the
project is, in general, lower than the value if full commitment by the VC and the EN were
hypothetically possible. The value under full commitment is the “rational expectations”
value of the project, that is, the value after rationally incorporating the effects of future
physical capital investments by the VC and human capital investments by the EN.
To simplify the analysis and exposition, we assume the project does not generate inter-
mediate cash flows so that all payoffs occur upon termination (our analysis can be general-
ized to allow for intermediate cash flows without altering any of our main results). Hereafter,
we refer to the variable Vi as the project’s termination value at date i. The termination
value at any date is observable and verifiable and, therefore, contractible. The hypothetical
value of the project under full commitment by the VC and the EN, the rational expectations
value, is non-verifiable.
The VC has linear inter-temporal preferences whereas the EN is risk-averse with inter-
temporal CARA preferences. The VC chooses her dynamic investment policy, the long-
term renegotiation-proof contract for the EN, and the termination time (that is a random
stopping time in general) to maximize her expected utility payoff upon termination. The
EN, in turn, dynamically chooses his effort to maximize his expected utility payoff upon
termination. The contract between the VC and the EN, the VC’s investment policy, the
EN’s effort policy, and the termination time are derived endogenously in a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the dynamic game between the VC and the EN.
The incremental termination value, that is, the change in termination value over any
period, depends on the level of investment by the VC, the amount of effort exerted by
the EN, the intrinsic quality of the project, and market risk. The VC closely monitors
the EN so that the EN’s effort is observable to the VC. However, it is non-verifiable by
a third party and, therefore, not directly contractible. Both the VC and the EN have
imperfect information about the intrinsic quality of the project, but have priors on it that
may, in general, differ from each other. The VC and the EN update their assessments of the
project’s intrinsic quality in a Bayesian manner based on their observations of the project’s
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termination values, investments by the VC, and human capital inputs by the EN.
We begin by first describing how the VC’s physical capital investments and the EN’s
human capital (effort) investments affect the project’s termination value over time.
3.1.1 The evolution of the termination value
The termination value of the project in any period is proportional to the initial termina-
tion value V0, which we hereafter normalize to one. In each period i ≥ 1, the project’s
termination value evolves as follows
Vi − Vi−1 = ( cαi ηβi − li ) + Θ + Si. (1)
The change in termination value is derived from three sources— “net discretionary excess
output”, “project quality” and “systematic risk”—each of which is described below.
Net discretionary excess output. Discretionary excess output in period i is a direct
result of the VC’s capital investment ci and the EN’s effort ηi, and is described by the
Cobb-Douglas production function cαi η
β
i , α, β > 0. Net discretionary output in period i is
output less the “operating costs”, which we represent by an exogenous constant li. The
operating costs could include wages to salaried employees, depreciation expenses, decline
in revenues due to increased competition, fixed costs arising from increases in the scale of
the project, etcetera. These costs are assumed to increase through time. For convenience
and concreteness, we assume li = Li2, L > 0, which will ensure termination occurs in
finite time almost surely. All our results remain qualitatively unaltered under alternative
(deterministic) functional specifications of the operating costs as long as they are convex
over time.
Systematic risk. The Si represent the “systematic” component of the project’s risk. It is
common knowledge that the Si are independently and identically distributed with common
distribution N(0, s2).
Project quality. The variable Θ represents the per-period increase in the project’s ter-
mination value arising from the intrinsic quality of the project. The VC and the EN have
imperfect information about Θ and may also differ in their beliefs about its value. Their
respective beliefs are, however, common knowledge. The uncertainty in the value of Θ may
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be viewed as the project’s technical risk. The technical risk is resolved over time as the VC
and the EN update their priors on Θ in a Bayesian manner based on observations of the
firm’s performance.
Specifically, we assume that the VC’s and EN’s initial priors on Θ are normally dis-
tributed with Θ ∼ N(µV C0 , σ20) and Θ ∼ N(µEN0 , σ20), respectively. Define the random
variable
Yi := Vi − Vi−1 − cαi ηβi + li = Θ + Si, i = 1, 2, ...T − 1. (2)
Since the VC’s capital investment ci, and the EN’s effort ηi are observable, it follows from
well-known formulae (DeGroot 1970) that the posterior distribution on Θ for each date
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Note that E[µ`i | µ`i−1] = µ`i−1 since E[Yi | µ`i−1] = µ`i−1 and that the σi tend to zero. Let






∆0, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5)
denote the degree of asymmetry in beliefs at date i. It follows from (5) that the degree of
asymmetry in beliefs is resolved deterministically over time, and there is a linear relationship
between the resolution of the asymmetry of beliefs and the resolution of the technical risk.
Following Landier and Thesmar (2005), Sahlman (1990) and other researchers, we assume
the EN is initially more confident of the success of his ideas, and so ∆0 ≥ 0.
For future reference, we denote the information filtration of the probability space gen-
erated by the random variables {Vi, i ≥ 0} by {Fi}. We let {Gi} denote the information
filtration describing the history of termination values, effort choices by the EN, and capital
investments by the VC, which is known to both the VC and EN. Clearly, Fi ⊂ Gi.
3.1.2 VC-EN interaction
Since the project does not generate intermediate cash-flows, the contract between the VC
and the EN describes the payoffs to be received by both parties upon termination. Further,
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since either the VC or the EN could choose to terminate the relationship at any date, the
contract specifies the payoffs to be received by both parties as if the project were terminated
at any date in the set {0, 1, ...}.
More precisely, a feasible contract is described by the stochastic process P (·), where
P (i) is the EN’s payoff and Vi − P (i) is the VC’s payoff if the relationship is terminated
at date i ≥ 0. Since the EN owns the project at the initial date, P (0) equals V0. As the
project’s termination value is the only economic quantity that is contractible, the process
P (·) is {Fi}-measurable. If the project is terminated at date τ (where τ is a {Gi}-stopping













In (6), the parameter λ ≥ 0 characterizes the EN’s risk aversion. The EN’s disutility from
effort in period i is given by kηγi with k > 0, γ > 0.
By (6), the EN has multiplicative separable inter-temporal CARA preferences. We follow
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) in therefore restricting consideration to affine contractual
structures, that is, contracts where
P (i)− P (i− 1) = ai + bi(Vi − Vi−1), i = 1, 2, . . . . (7)
In (7), the contractual parameters ai, bi are {Fi−1}-measurable. It will follow from our
subsequent analysis that contracts where bi < 0 for any i cannot arise in equilibrium. Note
that the change in the EN’s promised payoff over period i is an affine function of the
incremental termination value Vi − Vi−1. It follows easily from (7) that the process P (·)
describing the EN’s contract is given by
P (τ) = P (0) +
τ∑
i=1
ai + bi(Vi − Vi−1). (8)
We show that, in equilibrium, the “fixed” component ai of the EN’s compensation in period
i depends on the history of past “signals” {V0, V1, . . . , Vi−1} whereas the “proportional”
component bi in period i is deterministic. It follows from (6) and (8) that the EN’s expected














At each date i, the EN can choose to terminate the relationship with the VC and receive
his payoff P (i), and therefore chooses to continue the relationship over the next period if
and only if his expected utility from continuation exceeds his utility from termination. The
continuation utility ratio of the EN at time i, CUR(i), is defined as the ratio of his expected
utility from continuing the relationship to his utility from termination. The continuation








aj + bj(Vj − Vj−1)− kηγj
)}]
(10)
where the notation EENi denotes the EN’s expectation conditioned on the information
available at date i, that is, the σ-field Gi. Since the EN has a negative exponential utility
function, the EN prefers a smaller continuation utility ratio. He, therefore, chooses to
continue the relationship if and only if his continuation utility ratio is at most one.
Similarly, the VC chooses to continue the relationship if her expected utility from con-
tinuing exceeds her utility from termination. We define the VC’s continuation value as the
expected increase in the VC’s utility if she continues the relationship, namely, the expected
value of the VC’s future compensations less her capital investments. The VC’s continuation
value at date i, CV (i), is given by




(1− bj)(Vj − Vj−1)− aj − cj
)]
, (11)
where EV Ci denotes the VC’s expectation conditioned on the information available at date i.
The VC chooses to continue the relationship at date i if and only if her continuation value is
non-negative. Since the VC possesses all the bargaining power in negotiations with the EN,
it follows that, in equilibrium, the EN’s continuation utility ratio is equal to one at every
date and in all states of the world. Moreover, the EN is indifferent between continuation
and termination in all states. The VC, on the other hand, terminates the relationship when
her continuation value is negative.
3.2 Equilibrium
In order to simplify the subsequent analysis and notation, we assume there exists a maximum
possible date T > 0 such that project termination will occur when the VC has a negative
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continuation value or at T , whichever comes earlier. We later show that this assumption
is not restrictive by demonstrating that a sufficiently large T could be chosen so that the
VC voluntarily terminates the project at a date earlier than T with probability arbitrarily
close to one. Our subsequent analysis also shows that the VC-EN relationship over any
time interval [0, t] does not depend on the choice of time horizon T > t , that is, the VC’s
investments, the EN’s contract P (·), and the EN’s effort over the time interval [0, t] do not
depend on the time horizon T > t.
The following two conditions on the parameters of the model are sufficient to ensure
that an equilibrium exists, and will be assumed throughout the remainder of the thesis:
Assumption 1 γ > β.
Assumption 2 (1− α) γβ ≥ 2.
The first condition implies that the EN faces decreasing returns to scale from the pro-
vision of effort. The second condition implies that the decreasing returns to scale from the
EN’s effort provision are sufficiently pronounced that the VC’s “contract choice” problem
has a solution, that is, an equilibrium exists. In the next Section we add a third condition,
which guarantees that the equilibrium is unique and stable.
We use backward induction to characterize the equilibrium. First consider the last
possible investment period i = T . Suppose that the project has not been terminated as of
the date T−1 (i.e. the beginning of period T ). Recall that the EN and VC priors on Θ as of
date T−1 are N(µjT−1, σ2T−1) with µjT−1 and σ2T−1 given by (4) and (3), respectively with the
index i set to T . For subsequent convenience in our inductive derivation of the equilibrium,
it will be convenient to use the index i to denote the time period. The index i = T for now,
but it will later denote an arbitrary time period when we establish the inductive step in our
analysis.
3.2.1 The EN’s Optimal Effort in Period T for a Given Contract
Suppose that, in period i (recall that i = T ), the VC’s investment is c and the EN’s con-
tractual parameters are (a, b) (see 7). If the EN exerts effort η in period i, his continuation
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= cαηβ − li + µENi−1 ,












Since the EN prefers a lower continuation utility ratio he will choose the effort level to







3.2.2 The VC’s Choice of Contract in Period T
The VC rationally anticipates the EN’s best response to his contract. She therefore chooses
her investment c and the EN’s contractual parameters (a, b) so that the EN’s participation
constraint is satisfied, that is, the EN’s continuation utility ratio is at most one (recall that
the EN has a negative exponential utility function). Since the VC has the bargaining power,
it is optimal for her to choose (a, b) so that the EN’s continuation utility ratio is equal to
one, that is, his participation constraint is satisfied with equality. We can then show that





2) + kη(b, c)γ − b(cαη(b, c)β − li + µENi−1 ). (15)
The above condition guarantees that the EN’s continuation utility ratio is exactly one
regardless of the state at date i−1, that is,
CUR(i−1) ≡ 1. (16)
1Recall that E[exp{−λX}] = exp{−λ(µ̂− λ
2
σ̂2)} if X ∼ N(µ̂, σ̂2).
2Note that Assumption 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the EN’s problem to be well-defined.
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(1− b)(Vi − Vi−1)− a(b, c)− c
]
. (17)







cαηβ − li + Yi
]
= cαηβ − li + µV Ci−1 ,
the VC’s continuation value simplifies to
Λi(b, c) := ∆i−1b− 12pi−1b
2 + φ(b)cα
γ
γ−β − c + µV Ci−1 − li . (18)
In (18),
















where σ2i−1 and ∆i−1 are given in (3) and (5), respectively.
It remains to determine the VC’s optimal choices for the capital investment ci and risky
compensation bi to the EN to maximize her continuation value (18). We begin with the
optimal investment c(b) as a function of the risky compensation b. The optimal investment
will be zero whenever b ≥ γ/β. This extraordinary outcome would occur if the degree
of asymmetry ∆i−1 is sufficiently high. We shall impose an upper bound on ∆0 that
guarantees the investment is positive if the project continues. Fix then a value of b ∈
(0, γ/β). Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee the function Λi(b, ·) is strictly concave in the
investment c (the exponent on c is guaranteed to be less than 1). As a consequence, setting




from which the VC’s continuation value as a function of the risky compensation, Λi(b, c(b)),
is given by
Λi(b, c(b)) = ∆i−1b− 12pi−1b
2 + Kc(b) + (µV Ci−1 − li) . (22)
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The constants K̂ and K in (21) and (22) are positive and depend on α, β and γ. Let
Fi(b) := ∆i−1b− 12pi−1b
2 + Kc(b) (23)
denote the variable portion of the VC’s continuation value at the beginning of period i. The
VC clearly chooses the risky compensation in period i to solve
F ∗i := max
b≥0
Fi(b). (24)
3.2.3 The Inductive Step
We now set i = T −1, and suppose the project has not been terminated as of the beginning
of this period (i.e. date T−2). If in period i the VC’s investment is c, the EN’s contractual













− λ(a + b(Vi − Vi−1)− kηγ
)]
, (25)
The first line above follows by the law of iterated expectations and the second line follows
by (16). Since the expression (25) is identical to (12), we may use our previous arguments
to show that the EN’s optimal effort is η(b, c) given in (14) and the “fixed” component of
the EN’s compensation is a(b, c) given in (15).
It remains to determine the VC’s optimal choices for the investment and risky compen-
sation. Incorporating the EN’s best (effort) response, the VC’s continuation value at the
beginning of period i (recall that the index i = T − 1) is given by
CV (i−1) = EV Ci−1
[
(1−b)(Vi−Vi−1)− a(b, c)− c + max{CV (i), 0}
]
(26)
= Λi(b, c) + EV Ci−1
[
max{CV (i), 0}] . (27)
The above follows from the fact that the expression
EV Ci−1
[
(1− b)(Vi − Vi−1)− a(b, c)− c
]
is identical to (17) and hence (18). As the right-hand side of (27) is unaffected by the actions
taken by the VC and EN during period i, we may use our previous arguments to show that
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the VC’s continuation value in period i will be maximized when the optimal investment is
given by (21) and the optimal risky compensation solves (24).
We can clearly extend the above arguments by induction to any period i and thereby
derive the unique equilibrium, as characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Characterization of Equilibrium)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if the project has not been terminated as of date i−1, 1 ≤
i ≤ T , then the equilibrium contract offered by the VC and the EN’s effort in the period is
characterized, as follows:
• The risky compensation is b∗i , the unique solution to (24);
• The investment is c∗i := c(b∗i ) defined in (21);
• The fixed compensation is a∗i := a(b∗i , c∗i ) defined in (15);
• The optimal effort level is η∗i := η(b∗i , c∗i ) defined in (14).
• The VC’s maximum continuation value at date i−1 is given by
CV (i−1) =
within-period flow︷ ︸︸ ︷
F ∗i + µ
V C
i−1 − li +
future option value︷ ︸︸ ︷
EV Ci−1
[
max{CV (i), 0}] . (28)
3.3 Properties of the Equilibrium in Each Period
We now begin our analysis of the properties of the equilibrium that is characterized in
Theorem 1. In this section, we focus on the VC’s equilibrium investment c∗i and the EN’s
contractual parameters a∗i and b
∗
i in a given period i conditional on the project not having
been terminated. By our earlier discussion, the VC continues funding the project in period
i if and only if her continuation value (28) is nonnegative. Since the degree of asymmetry
in beliefs ∆i−1 and variance σ2i−1 are deterministic functions of time, an examination of (24)
and (28) reveals that the equilibrium values for the risky compensation, investment and
effort in each period are also deterministic. In addition, the controllable portion of the
“within-period flow” in period i, namely F ∗i , is also deterministic. The only component
of the contract that is stochastic and is adjusted based on realizations of the termination
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value Vi of the project (the “signal” of project quality) is the fixed component a∗i of the
EN’s compensation.
The within-period flow depends on the VC’s current assessment of project quality, µV Ci−1
and the operating costs, li. If the within-period flow is positive, the VC continues the
project. If it is negative, the VC continues the project only if the “future option value” of
continuing is large enough to compensate for the current period’s expected loss. Keep in






i only “exist” if the project continues into
period i.
3.3.1 VC’s Objective Function
By (23) and (24), the nature of the equilibrium crucially depends on the VC’s objective
function
Fi(b) = ∆i−1b− 12pi−1b
2 + Kc(b) (29)
The objective function consists of three components:
• Economic rent from the EN’s optimism. The term, ∆i−1b, reflects the rents that the
VC extracts from the EN by “exploiting” his “optimism” about the project’s intrinsic
quality (we elaborate on this later).
• Cost of risk. The term, 12pi−1b2, reflects the VC’s costs of risk-sharing with the risk-
averse EN. We refer to the parameter, pi−1 = λ(σ2i−1 + s
2), as the “price of risk” in
period i.
• Return on investment. The “return on investment” term, Kc(b), reflects the VC’s
expected return as a result of his investment and the EN’s effort.
From (29), the EN’s risky compensation in equilibrium clearly depends on the optimal
investment function c(·). The following proposition establishes properties of this function
that play a key role in our subsequent analysis.
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Proposition 1
(i) The optimal investment function c(·) is strongly unimodal3 on [0, γβ ] and achieves its
maximum at b = 1.
(ii) The optimal investment function c(·) is strictly concave on [0, bM ] and strictly con-
vex on [bM , γβ ], where bM ∈ (1, γβ ) is the unique minimum of the marginal optimal
investment function c′(·).
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the optimal investment function.4 The intuition for the
non-monotonicity of the optimal investment function, which is important for understanding
our subsequent results, is as follows. An increase in the risky compensation increases the
EN’s incentives to exert effort, but also increases the costs arising from the EN’s higher
disutility of effort (these costs are indirectly borne by the VC due to the EN’s participation
constraint) and the costs of risk-sharing with the risk-averse EN. For lower values of the
risky compensation, the benefits of improved risk-sharing with the EN predominate so that
the VC finds it beneficial to increase her investment. However, beyond a threshold level of
risky compensation, the costs of risk-sharing outweigh the benefits so that the VC reduces
her investment. In these regions, the VC induces the EN to exert high effort to generate
value, but commits less money. In fact, our subsequent results establish that the equilibrium
risky compensation for the EN exceeds 1 only if the degree of asymmetry in beliefs about
the project’s quality exceeds a threshold. In these scenarios, the VC “exploits” the EN’s
exuberance about the project’s prospects.
The ratio of the initial degree of asymmetry of beliefs to the initial price of risk, namely,
∆0/p0, provides an a priori bound on a solution to (24).
3Recall that a real-valued function of one variable f is strongly unimodal on the interval [a, b], a < b, if
there exists an x∗ ∈ (a, b) such that f is increasing on [a, x∗] and f is decreasing on [x∗, b]. Obviously, the
value x∗ maximizes f on [a, b]. This class of functions possesses a very simple but extremely useful property
for analysis, which we repeatedly exploit: If f is strongly unimodal on [a, b] and also differentiable, then
the sign of the derivative indicates the direction of the optimum solution, i.e., if f ′(x) > 0, then x∗ > x;
if f ′(x) < 0, then x∗ < x; and if f ′(x) = 0, then x∗ = x. A simple and extremely fast (bisection search)
algorithm will find the optimal solution to a strongly unimodal function.
4Unless otherwise stated, the parameters for all figures in this thesis are α = 0.3875, γ
β
= 3.2653,
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Figure 1: Optimal investment function
Proposition 2
(i) If ∆0/p0 ≤ 1, then an optimal solution to (24) is at most 1.
(ii) If ∆0/p0 > 1, then an optimal solution to (24) is less than ∆0/p0.
In our subsequent analysis we assume that
Assumption 3 ∆0/p0 ≤ bM ,
where the parameter bM is defined in Proposition 1. The above condition implies that the
initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆0 of the EN and the VC is below a threshold relative
to the price of risk p0.
It follows from Proposition 2 and Assumption 3 that a solution to (24) must lie in the
interval [0, bM ]. By Proposition 1, the VC’s objective function is easily seen to be strictly
concave and hence strongly unimodal. Consequently, there exists a unique solution b∗i to
(24), which we show must be positive.5 We summarize these observations with the following
proposition.
5The marginal optimal investment evaluated at zero is infinite.
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Proposition 3
Under Assumptions 1-3, each Fi(·) is strictly concave and hence strongly unimodal on
[0, bM ], and the solution to (24) is positive and less than bM .
Remark 1
The strong unimodality of the function Fi ensures the stability of the equilibrium described
in the above theorem, that is, the EN’s equilibrium risk-free and risky compensation and
effort choices, and the VC’s capital investments are continuous functions of the model para-
meters. Moreover, the equilibrium risky compensation can easily be numerically computed
using an efficient bisection search—see footnote 3.
We now use the above results to further analyze the VC’s objective function (29) and
thereby determine the properties of the EN’s equilibrium risky compensation. By the result
of Proposition 3, the VC’s objective function attains a unique, interior maximum so that its
derivative must necessarily vanish at this maximum. The derivative of the VC’s objective
is
F ′i (b) = ∆i−1 − pi−1b + Kc′(b). (30)
The EN’s equilibrium risky compensation b∗i in period i is therefore determined by the
interplay among the degree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆i−1, the price of risk pi−1, and the
marginal optimal investment function c′(·). The following proposition precisely describes
how the relation between the degree of asymmetry in beliefs and the price of risk affect the
EN’s equilibrium risky compensation in any period.
Proposition 4
Suppose that the VC-EN relationship is active in period i, that is, the project has not been
terminated prior to date i. When the degree of asymmetry of beliefs ∆i−1 at date i − 1 is
less than (equal, greater than) the price of risk pi−1, the corresponding equilibrium risky
compensation parameter b∗i is less than (equal, greater than) 1.
The intuition for the results of the above proposition can be understood using the
intuition for the non-monotonicity of the optimal investment function c(·) described earlier.
The VC’s optimal choice of risky compensation for the EN reflects the tradeoff between
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providing appropriate incentives for the EN to exert effort with the costs of risk-sharing
with the risk-averse EN and the costs associated with the EN’s disutility of effort. This
tradeoff is significantly affected by the degree of asymmetry of beliefs about the project’s
quality as the VC could “exploit” the EN’s optimism by inducing him to exert greater effort
without incurring significant risk-sharing costs. When the degree of asymmetry of beliefs
is lower than the price of risk (the EN is “reasonably optimistic”), the VC chooses a level
of risky compensation less than one as the costs of risk sharing dominate the benefits of
the EN’s optimism. However, if the degree of asymmetry of beliefs exceeds the price of
risk (the EN is “exuberant”), the VC “exploits” the EN by inducing her to accept a level
of risky compensation that exceeds one. The effects of the EN’s optimism and the costs
of risk-sharing and effort are “perfectly balanced” when the degree of asymmetry in beliefs
equals the cost of risk. In this scenario, the EN’s risky compensation is exactly equal to
one.
Remark 2
As we subsequently demonstrate, when the EN is initially “reasonably optimistic”, i.e.,
∆0 < p0, he will remain so classified as time goes by. However, when the EN is initially
“exuberant”, i.e., ∆0 > p0, the resolution of the technical uncertainty about the project’s
intrinsic quality over time leads to a decline in the EN’s level of optimism so that he
eventually shifts from being “exuberant” to “ reasonably optimistic”.
The following proposition describes the effect of the degree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆i−1
and the price of risk pi−1 = λ(σ2i−1 + s
2) on the equilibrium levels of risky compensation and
investment in period i.
Proposition 5
(i) The equilibrium risky compensation parameter b∗i in period i is a decreasing function
of the price of risk (and hence the individual parameters λ, s2, and σ2i−1), and is an
increasing function of the degree of asymmetry of beliefs.
(ii) When the degree of asymmetry of beliefs is less (more) than the price of risk, the
equilibrium level of investment c∗i in period i is a decreasing (increasing) function of
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the price of risk and an increasing (decreasing) function of the degree of asymmetry
of beliefs.
Remark 3
With regard to the equilibrium level of effort, it is clear from (14) that when the degree
of asymmetry of beliefs is less than the price of risk, the equilibrium effort is a decreasing
function of the price of risk and an increasing function of the degree of asymmetry of beliefs.
However, when the degree of asymmetry exceeds the price of risk, the equilibrium effort
might be non-monotonic.
An increase in the EN’s perception of the project’s intrinsic quality means he is willing
to accept more risky compensation from the VC.
3.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
In the previous section, we described the “static” properties of the equilibrium, that is,
the level of investment by the VC and the EN’s contractual parameters in a given period
(conditional on continuation of the project). In this section, we investigate the dynamics of
the equilibrium, that is, we describe the evolutions of the EN’s contract, his effort, and the
VC’s investment. We show that the interplay between the technical risk of the project that
represents the uncertainty about the project’s intrinsic quality, and the degree of asymmetry
in beliefs about the project’s quality is the key determinant of the dynamics of the VC-EN
relationship.
Before analyzing the general scenario where there is imperfect information as well as
asymmetry in beliefs about the project’s quality, we briefly discuss two “benchmark” sce-
narios.
3.4.1 Symmetric Attitudes towards Risk and Symmetric Beliefs about Project
Quality (Full Symmetry)
In this scenario, the VC and the EN are both risk-neutral and have symmetric beliefs about
the project’s quality. Therefore, λ = 0 and ∆i = 0 for all i.6 It follows that the first and
second components of the VC’s objective function (29) are zero. The third component, the
6With CARA preferences, maximizing utility converges to maximizing the mean as λ → 0.
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return on investment, is always maximized at b = 1 (Proposition 1). Therefore, the equi-
librium levels of risky compensation, the VC’s investment and the EN’s effort are constant
through time, and the VC’s investment is at its highest possible level. These results follow
from the fact that as the VC and the EN have symmetric attitudes towards risk and sym-
metric beliefs, they effectively function as a monolithic agent. Moreover, the risk-neutrality
of the VC/EN implies that risk (systematic and technical) of the project does not affect the
level of investment, the EN’s contract, or his effort.
Remark 4
While it is true that the investment levels are at their highest level in this scenario, it
is important to emphasize that project value need not attain its maximum possible value.
Optimism on the part of the EN can potentially be exploited by the VC by inducing greater
effort from the EN thereby generating more value.
3.4.2 Perfect Information
In the perfect information case the EN is risk averse (λ > 0) but there is perfect information
about the project’s quality so that there is no technical risk (σ20 = 0) In this scenario, the
VC’s objective function
Fi(b) = F (b) := −λ2 s
2b2 + Kc(b), (31)
is independent of time. The time paths of risky compensation, investment and effort are all
constant; we let b∗p, c∗p and η∗p denote the corresponding equilibrium values.
By Proposition 1 the optimal investment function achieves it maximum at b = 1, which
implies that c′(1) = 0. Since
F ′(b∗p) = 0, (32)
it follows from (31) that F ′(1) < 0. The strong unimodality of F (b) now guarantees that
b∗p < 1, and therefore both c∗p and η∗p are less than the investment and effort levels in the “full
symmetry” scenario where the VC and the EN are both risk-neutral and have symmetric
beliefs about project quality.
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3.4.3 Imperfect Information, Asymmetric Beliefs and Asymmetric Risk Atti-
tudes - The Actual Scenario
We now analyze the scenario of interest where the attitudes towards risk as well as beliefs







denote, respectively, the equilibrium levels of risky compensation, investment and effort in
period i (if the project has not been terminated).
The equilibrium paths of the EN’s risky compensation, the (b∗i ), the VC’s investments,
the (c∗i ), and the EN’s effort, the (η
∗
i ), depend on the interplay among the three components
of the VC’s objective function (29)—the economic rent from the EN’s optimism, the cost of
risk and the return on investment. As the third component is obviously constant through
time, the evolution of the optimal value F ∗i of the VC’s objective function is determined
by the evolutions of the first two components, which are deterministic functions of time.
Both ∆i−1 and pi−1 decrease with time so that the sum of the first two components is not
necessarily monotonic with time. Consequently, the equilibrium values F ∗i (the maximum
value of the VC’s objective function 29), are not generally monotonic, either.
We now present a complete characterization of the equilibrium dynamics of the VC-EN






b2)σ2i−1 + F (b). (33)
Since σi → 0, it follows from the Envelope Theorem that b∗i → b∗p, and thus (c∗i , η∗i ) →
(c∗p, η∗p) by continuity. We now precisely describe the manner in which these economic
variables converge to their asymptotic values. To simplify the subsequent exposition, we







Note that i∗ is positive only when the EN is initially “exuberant”; otherwise, it is always
zero. The following theorem describes the evolutions of the EN’s risky compensation, his
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Figure 2: Optimal risky compensation path for different levels of initial asymmetry
Theorem 2 (The Dynamics of the Equilibrium Contract)
(i) If ∆0 < λσ20b
∗














(ii) If ∆0 = λσ20b
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(iii) If ∆0 > λσ20b
∗
p, then the b
∗





i = i∗ and then decrease monotonically towards c∗p, and the η∗i decrease monotonically
towards η∗p when i ≥ i∗.
Remark 5
The value of i∗ is precisely the point in time when the EN’s risky compensation parameter is
1 and the investment is at its maximum. Prior to this point in time, the EN is “exuberant”
and risky compensation exceeds one. After this point in time, the EN is “reasonably
optimistic” and his risky compensation parameter in less than 1. The VC’s equilibrium
investment path is non-monotonic when the EN is initially “exuberant”. When the EN is
initially “reasonably” optimistic, i.e., i∗ = 0, investments by the VC decrease over time.
The intuition for the results of Theorem 2 hinges on the complex interplay among the
value-enhancing effort by the EN that is positively affected by his optimism, the costs of
risk-sharing due to the EN’s risk aversion that is affected by the project’s systematic and
technical risk, and the effect of both the VC’s physical capital investment and the EN’s
effort on output.
49
The passage of time causes technical risk to be resolved thereby lowering the costs of
risk-sharing. However, the passage of time also lowers the degree of asymmetry in beliefs of
the VC and the EN as successive project realizations cause the EN to revise his optimistic
assessment of project quality. The decline in the degree of asymmetry in beliefs lowers the
rents that the VC can extract by exploiting the EN’s optimism.
If the initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs is below a threshold so that the EN is
“reasonably optimistic”, the beneficial effect of time on the costs of risk-sharing dominate
so that the EN’s risky compensation and effort both increase. As the EN’s effort increases
over time, the VC optimally lowers her investment over time
If the degree of asymmetry in beliefs is above a threshold so that the EN is “exuberant”,
he is willing to accept all the risk of the project so that his risky compensation and effort
are initially high. The negative effect of the evolution of time on the degree of asymmetry
in beliefs, however, dominates its positive effect on the costs of risk-sharing so that the
EN’s risky compensation effort declines over time. Due to the previously discussed non-
monotonic relation between the VC’s investment and the EN’s risky compensation, the VC’s
investment initially increases to “compensate” for the decrease in effort of the EN. After a
certain point in time when the VC’s investment attains its maximum, the decreasing effort
of the EN makes it optimal for the VC to also lower her capital investments.
There exists an initial degree of asymmetry of beliefs for which the positive effects of
the resolution of technical risk on the costs of risk sharing and its negative effects on the
EN’s incentives to exert effort due to his effort balance each other exactly so that risky
compensation, investment, and effort are constant over time.
Figure 2 illustrates the results of Theorem 2 and the intuition underlying it. It describes
three possible trajectories of risky compensation, whose outcomes depend on the initial de-
gree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆0.7 When the initial asymmetry is low compared to the initial
technical risk and the EN’s risk-aversion, the positive effect of the resolution of technical
risk dominates the negative effect of the resolution of the asymmetry. Consequently, risky
compensation increases with time. When the initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs is high
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Figure 3: Equilibrium investment paths
relative to the initial technical risk and degree of risk-aversion, the negative effect of the
resolution of asymmetry now dominates the positive effect of the resolution of technical
risk, and risky compensation now decreases with time.
Figure 3 depicts three possible trajectories of investment, whose outcomes depend on
∆0.8 When ∆0 = 0.5, the economic rent component is not sufficiently high to place the
initial risky compensation above 1, and so the risky compensation path lies below 1. Conse-
quently, the value of i∗ is zero, and so the equilibrium investment path is strictly decreasing.
3.5 Sensitivity of Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, we investigate how the equilibrium dynamics are affected by changes in the
degree of asymmetry in beliefs, ∆0, the EN’s risk aversion, λ, the project’s initial technical
risk, σ20, the EN’s cost of effort, k, and the systematic risk, s
2.
In light of Theorem 2, the subsequent analysis critically depends on the initial value
of the degree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆0. The EN is termed “reasonably optimistic” if
∆0 ∈ [0, λs2b∗p) and “exuberant” if ∆0 ∈ (λs2b∗p, p0bM ).9
8The value 2.1876 = bMp0 .
9Recall that Assumption 3 guarantees that ∆0 ≤ p0bM .
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3.5.1 Risk
The following theorem characterizes the effects of the EN’s risk aversion, λ, the initial
technical risk, σ20, and the systematic risk, s
2 on the equilibrium dynamics. The statements
below regarding the systematic risk, s2, require the additional condition that
Assumption 4 ∆0 < 2p0.
This condition is automatically satisfied when bM < 2. Recall that our prior assumptions
ensure the b∗i must lie below bM ; it is quite reasonable to assume the problem parameters
are such that the risky compensation offered to the EN by the VC would not exceed twice
the change in termination value.
Theorem 3
(i) The EN’s equilibrium risky compensation in any period is a decreasing function of
the price of risk and, therefore, the EN’s risk aversion λ and the initial technical risk
σ20. This property also holds for the systematic risk s
2 under Assumption 4.
(ii) If the EN is initially reasonably optimistic, then the VC’s equilibrium investment in
any period is a decreasing function of the price of risk and, therefore, the EN’S risk
aversion λ and the initial technical risk σ20. This property also holds for the systematic
risk s2 under Assumption 4.
(iii) If the EN is initially exuberant, then the path of equilibrium investment by the VC
changes as in Figure 4 as a result of a change in the price of risk and, therefore, a
change in the EN’s risk aversion λ and the initial technical risk σ20.
10 (The time-path
of investment moves “to the left” if the initial price of risk increases.) This property
also holds for the systematic risk s2 under Assumption 4.
Remark 6
Figure 4 demonstrates that the path of equilibrium investment will converge to different
limiting values depending on the EN’s risk aversion.





3 7 11 15 19 23 27 31















.... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... ... .... .. ... .... ..... ..... .... ... .. .. .. ... ... .. .. .... .... ........ .... .... ... .... .... ... ... .... .... ... ... .... .... ... .. .. ... ... .. .. .. .. ... ... .. .. ... .... .......
λ = 1.0938
Figure 4: Sensitivity of equilibrium investment path to the price of risk.
The EN’s risky compensation compensation parameter b∗i in any period i declines with
his risk aversion, the initial technical risk, and the systematic risk as an increase in any of
these parameters increases the costs of risk-sharing between the VC and the EN.
The effects of risk aversion, systematic and technical risk on the VC’s investment path
are, however, more subtle due to the presence of asymmetric beliefs. If the EN is initially
reasonably optimistic, the costs of risk sharing outweigh the benefits of the EN’s optimism.
The VC’s equilibrium investment path, therefore, declines pointwise with the EN’s risk
aversion and the project’s market and technical risk in this region. If the EN is initially
exuberant, an increase in risk increases the costs of risk sharing, thereby partially offsetting
the VC’s rents from the EN’s exuberance. In early periods, it is beneficial for the VC to
“compensate” for the resulting decline in the EN’s effort by increasing investment. As time
passes, however, the EN’s degree of optimism declines thereby reducing the rents to the
VC. The costs of risk-sharing, therefore, dominate in later periods so that an increase in
risk results in a decline in the VC’s investment.
3.5.2 Asymmetry in beliefs
Not surprisingly, the effect of the initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆0 on the EN’s
equilibrium risky compensation path and the VC’s equilibrium investment path is opposite
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of equilibrium investment path to the initial asymmetry in beliefs
Theorem 4
(i) The EN’s equilibrium risky compensation parameter in any period increases with the
initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆0.
(ii) If the EN is initially reasonably optimistic, then the VC’s equilibrium investment in
any period is an increasing function of the initial degree of asymmetry in beliefs ∆0.
(iii) If the EN is initially exuberant, then the path of equilibrium investment by the VC
changes as in Figure 5 as a result of a change in the initial degree of asymmetry in
beliefs ∆0.11 (The time-path of investment moves “to the right” if the initial degree
of asymmetry increases.)
While the trajectory of b moves upward (downward) if ∆0 increases (decreases), the influence
of a perturbation of ∆0 on the trajectory of c depends on whether ∆0 lies in the increasing
or decreasing region.
3.5.3 Cost of effort
The influence of a change in the cost of effort k on the EN’s equilibrium risky compensation
again depends on whether the EN is initially reasonably optimistic or exuberant.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of risky compensation to the cost of effort
Theorem 5
(i) If the EN is initially reasonably optimistic, then his equilibrium risky compensation
parameter in any period is a decreasing function of the cost of effort k.
(ii) If the EN is initially exuberant, then the change in his path of risky compensation as
a result of a change in his cost of effort is as described in Figure 6.12
(iii) The VC’s equilibrium investment path is a pointwise decreasing function of the EN’s
cost of effort k.
The intuition for the effect of a change in the cost of effort on the equilibrium paths of
risky compensation and investment is as follows. When the degree of asymmetry of beliefs
is “low” in comparison to the price of risk, the economic rents that the VC can potentially
capture due to the EN’s exaggerated assessment of project quality are low compared with
the costs of risk sharing and inducing effort from the EN. Therefore, as the EN’s cost of
effort increases, the VC lowers the EN’s risky compensation as well as her own investment
in the project in each period. On the other hand, if the EN is initially exuberant so that the
degree of asymmetry of beliefs is “high” in comparison to the price of risk, the beneficial
12The parameters σ0 = 0.1 and ∆0 = 1.31256.
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effects of exploiting the EN’s exuberance about the project’s prospects dominate the costs
of risk sharing and inducing effort in early periods. Therefore, the VC increases the EN’s
risky compensation in early periods, but lowers her own investment. As time evolves,
project realizations cause the EN to revise his own assessment of project quality so that
the costs of risk sharing eventually dominate the rents from exploitation. Hence, the EN’s
risky compensation and the VC’s investment both decline in later periods.
3.6 Project Duration
In our analysis thus far, we have examined the dynamics of the VC’s investments, the
EN’s compensation, and the EN’s effort conditional on the project’s continuation. As
described earlier, the VC continues the project as long as her expected continuation value
is positive. We now investigate the optimal termination decision of the VC, that is, the
project’s duration.
We first describe the optimal termination policy of the VC.
Proposition 6
The optimal stopping policy for the VC is a trigger policy: there exist µ∗i , 0 ≤ i ≤ T − 1,
such that the VC should terminate the project only if µV Ci < µ
∗
i .
The intuition for the above result is straightforward. At any date i, the VC’s expected
continuation value increases with her current assessment µ∗i of the project’s quality. Since
the VC continues the project if and only if her expected continuation value is nonnegative,
at each date, there exists a trigger level such that she continues the project if and only if
her current assessment of the project’s quality exceeds the trigger.
This trigger policy can be also expressed to depend on the termination value instead of
the quality assessment. By equation (1)












and therefore we can express
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Substituting (36) in µi given in (4) we have
µV Ci =














and may conclude that
µi ≥ µ∗i if and only if Vi ≥ V ∗i ,
where














The sequence of the V ∗i may be thought of as the performance targets the firm must reach
at each date or else it will terminate the project. Thus, either the µ∗i or the V
∗
i may be used
to define the trigger policy; the performance targets are more commonly used in practice.
The following result describes the effect of the EN’s initial assessment of project quality,
his risk aversion, and his cost of effort on the duration of the project.
Proposition 7
The project duration τ (i) increases with the EN’s initial assessment of project quality,
∆EN0 , and (ii) decreases with his risk aversion, λ, and his cost of effort, k.
As discussed earlier, an increase in the EN’s initial degree of optimism about project
quality increases the rents that the VC is able to extract by exploiting the EN’s optimism
thereby increasing her expected continuation value in every period. Hence, it is optimal
for the VC to prolong the project’s duration. An increase in the EN’s risk aversion or
cost of effort, however, increases the costs of risk-sharing for the VC, thereby lowering her
continuation value in every period. Hence, the VC terminates the project earlier.
In the next section, we numerically analyze the effects of the project’s market and
technical risk on the duration of the VC-EN relationship. We demonstrate the striking
result that market and technical risk generally have opposing effects on the project duration.




For any δ > 0 there exists an N > 0 such that, for any N ′ ≥ N , in the scenario where the
maximum possible number of periods is N ′, the termination time is strictly less than N
with probability greater than 1− δ.
3.7 Proofs
To simplify the notation in the proofs to follow, we make a useful observation. The incre-
mental change in termination value (1) depends on η only through the terms ηβ, ηγ . There
is no loss of generality if the unit of effort is redefined as z := ηβ, the production function
is taken as cαz and the disutility of effort is taken as zγ/β . Note how the equilibrium, as
characterized in Theorem 1, depends on the parameters β and γ only through their ratio
γ/β. Accordingly, we shall hereafter normalize β to 1.










(1− α)γ − 1 and s :=
αγ
(1− α)γ − 1 , (39)
and where the symbol ∝ means “equal up to a positive multiplicative constant”. Under
Assumption 2, the parameter s is positive and the parameter t is negative. (Keep in mind
that β is now 1.) Since γ > 1 (Assumption 1), the strong unimodality of c(·) easily follows
from (38). Since c(0) = c(γ) = 0 and c′(0) = +∞, it also follows from (38) that c(·) achieves
its maximum at b = 1. Part (i) has been established.
As for part (ii), the second derivative is given by
c′′(b) ∝ bt−1(γ − b)s−1[t(γ − b)(1− b)− sb(1− b)− b(γ − b)]. (40)
The expression inside the brackets is a strictly convex quadratic function whose value at 1
is negative, whose value at γ > 1 is positive, and whose value at 0 is negative since t < 0.
Consequently, there is exactly one root bM of the quadratic in the interval (1, γ) such that
c′′(bM ) = 0. At bM the marginal investment is at its minimum. Moreover, since c′′(·) is
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negative on [0, bM ) and is positive on (bM , γ), the optimal investment function is therefore
strictly concave on [0, bM ] and strictly convex on [bM , γ]. This establishes part (ii).
We note the ratio of the asymmetry of beliefs ∆i−1 to the price of risk pi−1 = λ(s2 +σ2i−1)







Using (41), we shall find it convenient to express the derivative of Fi (23) as






this functional form shall be repeatedly exploited in the proofs to follow.






≤ 0 if ∆0p0 ≤ b. Parts (i) and (ii) now
directly follow from (42) and Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 1, each Fi is the sum of a concave and strictly
concave function on [0, bM ], and so is strictly concave on this region, too. Since bM > 1,
it follows directly from Proposition 2 that an optimal solution to (24) must lie below bM .
Since F ′i (0) = +∞, the optimal solution must be positive.
With a slight abuse of notation, for each parameter “Π” we let bi(π) and ci(π) denote,
respectively, the value of b and c at date i when the parameter Π’s value equals π, and we
let b(π) and c(π) denote the entire time path of pay performance sensitivity and optimal
investment when the parameter Π’s value equals π. We shall also write F ′i (b, π) to make
explicit the functional dependence of the derivative of Fi on the parameter value π.
The following simple observation, embodied in the following Lemma, will be used re-
peatedly in the proofs to follow.
Lemma 1
If F ′i (b, π) is an increasing (decreasing) function of π, then bi(π) is an increasing (decreasing)
function of π.
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Proof. Let π1 < π2. Suppose first that F ′i (b, π) is an increasing function of π. By definition,
0 = F ′i (bi(π
2), π2) = F ′i (bi(π
1), π1) < F ′i (bi(π
1), π2),
which immediately implies b(π1) < b(π2) by the strong unimodality of Fi. The proof in the
decreasing case is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 5. Each part follows by a straightforward application of Lemma 1.








Therefore, the sign of F ′i (b
∗
p) is identical to the sign of ∆0− λσ20b∗p. The strong unimodality
of each Fi(·) now ensures that if this sign is negative (positive) then the b∗i will lie strictly
below (above) b∗p. If the sign is zero then the b∗i coincide with b
∗
p. It remains to show the
convergence is monotonic in the first and third cases. To this end suppose ∆0 < λσ20b
∗
p.
Pick a period i. The optimal solution b∗i satisfies
0 = F ′i (b
∗
i ) = (
∆0
σ20
− λb∗i )σ2i−1 + F ′(b∗i ). (44)
Since F (·) is strongly unimodal, it follows from b∗i < b∗p and F ′(b∗p) = 0 that F ′(b∗i ) > 0. We
may conclude from (44) that ∆0/σ20 − λb∗i < 0. Since σ2i < σ2i−1, it now easily follows that
F ′i+1(b
∗
i ) = (
∆0
σ20
− λb∗i )σ2i + F ′(b∗i ) > F ′i (b∗i ) = 0,
which implies b∗i+1 > b
∗
i since Fi+1 is strongly unimodal. Thus, the b
∗
i increase monotonically
towards b∗p, as claimed. The argument when ∆0 > λσ20b
∗
p is analogous.




p. In this case the
b∗i increase monotonically towards b
∗
p, which is less than one. Since c is strongly unimodal
with a maximum at one, the c∗i will increase monotonically towards c
∗
p. The second case
is obvious. As for the third case, the ratio ∆0
λ(s2+iσ20)
in (42) is greater than, equal or less
than one depending on whether i is less than, equal or greater than i∗. Since c′ is negative
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on (1, γ) and positive on (0, 1), it now follows easily from (42) that b∗i > 1 when i < i
∗;
b∗i = 1 when i = i
∗; and b∗i < 1 when i > i
∗. Since the b∗i decrease monotonically towards
b∗p, initially the c∗i will increase until i = i
∗, and then will decrease monotonically towards
c∗p, as claimed.
The result for the η∗i is the immediate consequence of the optimal effort function (14)
and the results for pay performance sensitivity and investment.
Proof of Theorem 3. We start by establishing the claims for the parameters π = λ, σ20.
As for part (i), by substituting (3) and (5) in (42),







we see that F ′i (b, π) is clearly decreasing in π. The result now follows from Lemma 1.
As for part (ii), we first suppose ∆0 lies in the increasing region. We know from Theorem
2 the b trajectory increases towards b∗p, which is less than one. Since the trajectory of b
is pointwise decreasing by part (i), and since c is an increasing function on [0, 1], the first
claim has been established.
Now suppose ∆0 lies in the decreasing region. Suppose π1 < π2. Let i∗j , j = 1, 2,
denote the value of i∗ (34) corresponding to πj . Clearly, i∗1 > i
∗
2. By Theorem 2, in the
interval [0, i∗2) both b(π
1) and b(π2) lie above one; since b(π1) > b(π2), it immediately
follows that c(π1) < c(π2) in this interval. Analogously, by Theorem 2, in the interval
(i∗1,∞) both b(π1) and b(π2) lie below one; since b(π1) > b(π2), it immediately follows that




2) is decreasing in this interval. Moreover, since ci∗1(π




2) = c(1), the trajectories c(π1) and c(π2) cross exactly once in this
interval.




is decreasing in s2. By (45), F ′1(b
∗
1, s
2) is clearly decreasing in s2. Now suppose i ≥ 2. The









and therefore the result will follow if we can establish that b∗i λ(2s






By assumption ∆0 < 2p0, and so b̂i < 1, which implies c′(b̂i) is positive. Therefore, the
derivative









is positive, and we may conclude that b∗i > b̂i since Fi is strongly unimodal. Thus,
b∗i λ(2s
2 + iσ20) > b̂iλ(2s
2 + iσ20) = ∆0,
as required.
Proof of Theorem 4. Part (i) follows by a straightforward application of Lemma 1.
As for the proof of part (ii), we first suppose ∆0 lies in the increasing region. We know
from Theorem 2 the b trajectory increases towards b∗p, which is less than one. Since c is an
increasing function on [0, 1], the first claim has been established.





j , j = 1, 2, denote the value of i
∗ (34) corresponding to ∆j0. Clearly,
i∗1 < i
∗






0) lie above one; since
b(∆10) < b(∆
2




0) in this interval. Analogously, by
Theorem 2, in the interval (i∗2,∞) both b(∆10) and b(∆20) lie below one; since b(∆10) < b(∆20),
it immediately follows that c(∆10) < c(∆
2
0) in this interval. By Theorem 2, we know c(∆
1
0)




0) is increasing in this interval. Moreover,
since ci∗1(∆
1






0) = c(1), the trajectories c(∆
1
0) and
c(∆20) cross exactly once in this interval.
Proof of Theorem 5.
Part (i). Suppose first ∆0 lies in the increasing region. We know from Theorem 2 the
trajectory of b lies strictly below b∗p, which is less than one. It follows the term Kc′(b) in
(42) is always positive. Since c′(b) is a decreasing function of k, it follows that F ′i (b, k) is
an increasing function of k, which establishes the claim by Lemma 1.
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Now suppose ∆0 lies in the decreasing region. The term Kc′(b) in (42) is negative when
b > 1 and positive when b < 1. Since c′(b) is a decreasing function of k, it follows that if
k1 < k2, then F ′i (b, k1) < F
′
i (b, k2) when b > 1 and F
′
i (b, k1) > F
′
i (b, k2) when b < 1. For a
fixed value of k the trajectory of b lies above 1 until time i = i∗ at which point it lies below
1 thereafter, and the value of i∗ is independent of k. The result now follows by Lemma 1.
Part (ii). When ∆0 lies in the increasing region, the trajectory of b lies below one. The
claim follows immediately from part (i).
Now suppose ∆0 lies in the increasing region and let k1 < k2. By Part 1 of this theorem,
(i) b(k1) < b(k2) in the interval [0, i∗), which immediately implies c(k1) > c(k2) since both
b(k1) and b(k2) lie above 1; and (ii) b(k1) > b(k2) in the interval (i∗,∞), which implies
c(k1) > c(k2) since both b(k1) and b(k2) lie below 1. At period i∗, b(k1) = b(k2) = 1. Since
c′(b) is a decreasing function of k, it follows ci∗(k1) > ci∗(k2).
We now make explicit the functional dependence of the VC’s continuation value (28) on
her current assessment of the project’s intrinsic quality and write it as CVi(µi). We drop
the superscript on µi since it shall always refer to the VC’s assessment. Let Z denote the
standard normal random variable. We note the continuation value may be expressed as
CVi(µi) =
[











max{CVi+1(σ̂iZ + µi), 0}
]
(50)
and σ̂2i := σ
2
i + s
2, and that there exists a uniform bound B on the F ∗i .
13
Lemma 2
CVi(µi) is nonnegative and bounded for each date i.
Proof. At date i the expected within-period value at any future date is bounded above by
µi + B, with a finite number of periods left (T − i), and so the VC’s continuation value at
13For example, one may set B := max
b≥0
[∆0b− λ/2 s2b2 + Kc(b)].
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date i is bounded above by the present value of this constant stream or zero, whichever is
larger.
Lemma 3
The continuation value CVi is a continuous, increasing function of µi for each date i, 0 ≤
i ≤ T − 1.
Proof. The function
CVT−1(µT−1) = F ∗T−1 + µT−1 − lT
is obviously an increasing, continuous function of µT−1, which implies from definition (50)
that the function eT−2 and hence CVT−2 are each increasing functions of µT−2, too. Given
that eT−2 is an increasing function, it is obviously finite by Lemma 2. Since the function
max{CVT−1(σ̂T−2Z + µT−2), 0}
is continuous in µT−2 (given the continuity of CVT−1), one may apply Lebesgue’s bounded
convergence theorem to establish that eT−2 is continuous, and hence CVT−2 is continuous,
too. We have demonstrated that CVT−2 is an increasing, continuous function of µT−2, as
claimed. The process continues recursively by using the increasing and continuous properties
of CVi+1 and Lemma 2 to establish the increasing, finite and then continuous properties of
ei.
Proof of Proposition 6. By Lemma 3 each function CVi is continuous and increasing.
The proof of Lemma 3 also shows that each ei is increasing, which implies each CVi is
negative for sufficiently small µi. Since each CVi is obviously positive for sufficiently high
µi, there exists a unique value µ∗i for which CVi(µ
∗
i ) = 0. Clearly, the VC should terminate
only if µi < µ∗i .
Proof of Proposition 7. The objective function Fi (29) is an increasing function of ∆EN0 ,
which implies that F ∗i is also a increasing function of ∆
EN
0 . One may proceed exactly as
in the proof of Lemma 3 to establish that each CVi is a pointwise increasing function of
∆EN0 , too, and it should be clear from the proof of Proposition 6 that the trigger values will
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decrease. Since a change in this parameter has no effect on the sample paths, the result (i)
follows. The proof of (ii) is the same, except that each Fi is now a decreasing function of
either λ or k, and thus the trigger values will increase.
Proof of Proposition 8. Pick ε > 0 and define θ0 so that P (Θ > θ0) = ε. Now
P (τ > i) = P{µt > µ∗t for all t = 0, 1, . . . , i} (51)
≤ P{µi > µ∗i } (52)
≤ P{µi > µ∗i | Θ ≤ θ0}P (Θ ≤ θ0) + P (Θ > θ0) (53)
≤ P{µi > µ∗i | Θ = θ0}+ ε. (54)
By Proposition 6 and the assumed property of the li, the µ∗i eventually lie above a positive
constant. Given this fact and the fact that the conditional distribution of
∑i
t=1 Yt/i given
Θ = θ0 is N(θ0, s2/i),













| Θ = θ0} → 0 as i →∞. (56)
The result now follows from (54) and (56) since ε was chosen arbitrarily.
65
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF RISK — A TWO-PERIOD MODEL
In Proposition 7 and its proof we find that continuation value and project duration are
increasing in the initial asymmetry in beliefs, ∆0, and decreasing with the risk aversion, λ,
and the cost of effort, k. In this chapter we continue this analysis by inquiring how contin-
uation value and project duration depend on the systematic risk and the initial technical
risk in a two-period model. These results illuminate the forces through which risk affects
the firm’s economics. We find clear distinction between the effects of the systematic risk
and the effects of technical risk. We show that risk may have positive effects on the firm
and demonstrate that risk effects need not be monotone.
4.1 Risk and Continuation Value
We assume there are at most two investment periods. We examine how the VC’s contin-
uation value at date zero, CV0, changes with initial technical risk and the systematic risk.
Keep in mind, by (28), CV0 is the sum of the first period’s within period flow and the second
period’s option value, namely,





where CV1, the VC’s continuation value at date 1, is given by
CV1 = F ∗2 − l2 + µV C1 . (58)
For expositional purposes, in what follows, we remove the VC notation from the µi. We
also assume symmetric information (∆0 = 0) to simplify the analysis. (In our discussion we
describe how asymmetry affects the results.) At date 0, CV1 is a random variable because
the second period quality µ1 is a random variable. In light of (4)








where π ∈ {σ20, s2}. Notice that a(·) is the expected second period’s within period flow as
viewed at date zero. The following two lemmas, whose proofs are in the last section of this
chapter, are key to understanding the various effects of risk on the continuation value.
Lemma 4
If λ > 0 then F ∗i is decreasing in s
2 and in σ20 for all i ≥ 1. If λ = 0 then F ∗i is independent
of s2 and in σ20 for all i.
Lemma 5




is of the form:
a(π)′K1 + b(π)′K2, π ∈ {σ20, s2}, (60)
where a(·) and b(·) are defined in (59) and K1 and K2 are positive.
We now turn to characterize the relationship between CV0 and risk.
Proposition 9
Assume symmetric information, i.e., ∆0 = 0.
(i) If the EN is risk averse (λ > 0) then CV0 is decreasing in the systematic risk, s2, but
may be non-monotonic in the initial technical risk, σ20.
(ii) If the EN is risk neutral (λ = 0) then CV0 is decreasing in the systematic risk, s2, and
increasing in the initial technical risk, σ20.
Proof: Observe that:
(a) By Lemma 4 and the definition of a(·), if λ > 0 then a(·) is decreasing in s2 and in
σ20.
(b) If λ = 0, then a(·) is independent of s2 and in σ20.
(c) b(·) is decreasing in s2 but increasing in σ20.
First suppose that λ > 0. By observation (a) the derivatives of a(·) and b(·) with respect
to s2 satisfy a′(·) < 0 and b′(·) < 0. Thus, CV0 is decreasing with s2 by Lemma 5. By
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observations (a) and (c) the derivatives of a(·) and b(·) with respect to σ20 satisfy a′(·) < 0 but
b′(·) > 0. Applying Lemma 5 reveals there are conflicting forces affecting the future option
value and accordingly CV0 may be non-monotonic. Now suppose λ = 0. Observation (b)
reveals that a(·) is independent of risk. Since b(·) is decreasing in s2, CV0 is also decreasing
in the systematic risk by Lemma 5. Similarly, since b(·) is increasing in σ20, CV0 is increasing
in the initial technical risk by Lemma 5.
Proposition 9 illuminates two means by which risk can affect the continuation value.
First, risk affects within period flow. As stated in Lemma 4, due to the added cost of risk
both the technical risk and the systematic risk negatively affect the within period flow when
the EN is risk averse. In addition, Lemma 5 reveals risk changes the future option value
of the continuation value. A more volatile future is advantageous since in the presence of
high volatility the VC enjoys the higher upside values without having to pay the price for
the lower downside values. Interestingly, Lemma 5 shows that technical risk and systematic
risk may have opposite effects on the option value. Increasing the systematic risk makes the
learning more difficult, which results in a posterior assessment closer to the prior assessment.
Thus, an increase in systematic risk is responsible for less volatility and less option value.
Increasing the initial technical risk, on the other hand, increases the ratio between the
technical and systematic risk and results in a more effective learning, which means that
the parties are very sensitive to the signals and the posterior assessment is more volatile.
Consequently, initial technical risk is positively tied with higher option value.
Proposition 9 shows that market risk is negatively tied with both components of the
continuation value, and so the continuation value at date zero decreases with market risk.
However, while technical risk increases the volatility, it simultaneously decreases the within
period flow and the net affect on the future option value is unclear (as implied by Lemma
5). Therefore, as stated in Proposition 9, the net effect of technical risk on the continuation
value is unclear and depends on the values of the model’s parameters.
When the parties have asymmetric beliefs matters are more complicated since the within
period flow, F ∗i , is not necessarily decreasing with the systematic risk. By (5) one can show
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Table 1: Risk forces affecting continuation value






No Agency 0 0 - -
Symmetric 0 - - -
Asymmetric + - - ±
Technical
No Agency 0 0 + +
Symmetric 0 - + ±
Asymmetric - - + ±
that ∆i is decreasing in σ20 and increasing in s
2. This is because increasing the systematic
risk diminishes the EN’s learning ability and therefore he does not update (decrease) ∆i
in as fast a pace. Increasing technical risk, however, has an opposite effect because it
increases the technical to market risk ratio, making the market risk relatively smaller. The
argument used in the proof of Lemma 4 may be used to show that F ∗i is not necessarily
decreasing in systematic risk but is still (or even more so) decreasing in technical risk.
Therefore, introducing asymmetric information on the one hand mitigates the positive effect
of technical risk on the continuation value and on the other hand mitigates the negative
effects of the systematic risk. We summarize how the “forces of risk” affect the continuation
value in Table 1.
The effects of risk on continuation value are demonstrated in Figures 7 - 9, which displays
lattices simulating the two-period model for different levels of initial technical risk. Recall,
σµ0 , the standard deviation of the VC’s assessment of the firm’s quality in the beginning of
the second period, is given by (73). At the end of the first period the VC’s assessment of
the firm’s quality moves up (u) by one standard deviation (σµ0 ), stays at the same level (m)
or moves down (d) σµ0 . Due to this structure, the corresponding probabilities p
u, pm, pd are
independent of the risk and are equal to (0.31,0.38,0.31), respectively. In each figure we
display for each period the asymmetry level, the price of risk and F ∗i − li, the within period
flow minus µi−1. Except for σ20, the value of the parameters is equal to the basic numbers
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given in Table 6 and Table 8.
Figure 7 describes the evolution of the two-period model for a low level of technical risk
(σ20 = 0.1) and for which CV0 = 0.5. Figure 8 reveals that increasing σ
2
0 to 0.5 decreases
CV0 to 0.41. The reason for this is the steep decline of the deterministic component of the
within period flow, F ∗i − li, i = 1, 2. This loss of income cannot compensate for the gains
due to the added volatility (CV u1 for σ
2




0 = 0.1). Further
increasing σ0 to 1 results in CV0 = 0.43 (Figure 9). The loss in F ∗i − li, i = 1, 2, as result
of the increase is less pronounced and therefore the increase in the volatility, manifested in
the higher µu1 and CV
u
1 , is the dominant force.
The reason why continuation value is initially decreasing and then increasing in σ20 is
explained by the magnitude of the within period flow when σ20 is low compared to when σ
2
0
is high. In the first case, the within period flow is large, thus the potential for great losses.
However, when σ20 is high the within period flow is small and it can never be negative. In
this case the gains in the volatility are more dominant and hence the continuation value
increases.
4.2 Risk and Project Duration
The expected timing of implementation, E[τ ], is closely tied with continuation value since
continued investment is conditioned on a positive continuation value. Assuming there is
initial investment, E[τ ] depends only on the continuation value of the second period. As
will be shown in the following proposition, we find it convenient to distinguish between
the case where the expected second period flow, a(·) := F ∗2 − l2 + µ0, is nonnegative and
the case where it is negative. When the expected second period is nonnegative investment
is guaranteed in the second period if the firm receives a neutral signal (i.e. µ1 = µ0)
and conversely if the expected second period flow is negative. The following proposition
describes how the project’s duration, assuming there is initial investment, changes with risk.
Proposition 10
Assume symmetric information, i.e., ∆0 = 0.
(i) Suppose the expected second period flow is nonnegative. If the EN is risk averse
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Period 2
CV x1 = F
∗
2 −l2+µx1
x ∈ {d,m, u}
∆1 = 0.417
λ(s2+σ21) = 0.31
F ∗2 −l2 = 0.039
wµ
d
1 = µ0−σµ0 = −0.029
CV d1 = 0.01
wµ
m
1 = µ0 = 0.1






CV u1 = 0.268
pu = Pr[µ1 ∈ (µ0 + σ
µ
0
2 ,∞)|µ0] = Pr[Z > 0.5] = 0.31
pm = Pr[µ1 ∈ [µ0 − σ
µ
0
2 , µ0 +
σµ0
2 ]|µ0] = Pr[−0.5 ≤ Z ≤ 0.5] = 0.38
pd = Pr[µ1 ∈ (−∞, µ0 − σ
µ
0
2 )|µ0] = Pr[Z < −0.5] = 0.31
Period 1










































Figure 7: Two period lattice for base numbers and initial technical risk σ20 = 0.1
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Period 2
CV x1 = F
∗
2 −l2+µx1
x ∈ {d,m, u}
∆1 = 0.25
λ(s2+σ21) = 0.41
F ∗2 −l2 = −0.096
wµ
d
1 = µ0−σµ0 = −0.4
CV d1 = −0.496
wµ
m
1 = µ0 = 0.1






CV u1 = 0.504
pu = Pr[µ1 ∈ (µ0 + σ
µ
0
2 ,∞)|µ0] = Pr[Z > 0.5] = 0.31
pm = Pr[µ1 ∈ [µ0 − σ
µ
0
2 , µ0 +
σµ0
2 ]|µ0] = Pr[−0.5 ≤ Z ≤ 0.5] = 0.38
pd = Pr[µ1 ∈ (−∞, µ0 − σ
µ
0
2 )|µ0] = Pr[Z < −0.5] = 0.31
Period 1










































Figure 8: Two period lattice for base numbers and initial technical risk σ20 = 0.5
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Period 2
CV x1 = F
∗
2 −l2+µx1
x ∈ {d,m, u}
∆1 = 0.167
λ(s2+σ21) = 0.456
F ∗2 −l2 = −0.140
wµ
d
1 = µ0−σµ0 = −0.716
CV d1 = −0.856
wµ
m
1 = µ0 = 0.1






CV u1 = 0.777
pu = Pr[µ1 ∈ (µ0 + σ
µ
0
2 ,∞)|µ0] = Pr[Z > 0.5] = 0.31
pm = Pr[µ1 ∈ [µ0 − σ
µ
0
2 , µ0 +
σµ0
2 ]|µ0] = Pr[−0.5 ≤ Z ≤ 0.5] = 0.38
pd = Pr[µ1 ∈ (−∞, µ0 − σ
µ
0
2 )|µ0] = Pr[Z < −0.5] = 0.31
Period 1










































Figure 9: Two period lattice for base numbers and initial technical risk σ20 = 1
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(λ > 0), then E[τ ] is decreasing in the initial technical risk, σ20, but may be non-
monotonic in the systematic risk, s2. If the EN is risk neutral (λ = 0), then E[τ ] is
decreasing in the initial technical risk, σ20, and increasing in the systematic risk, s
2.
(ii) Suppose the expected second period flow is negative. If the EN is risk averse (λ > 0),
then E[τ ] may be non-monotonic in the initial technical risk, σ20, and decreasing in
the systematic risk, s2. If the EN is risk neutral (λ = 0), then E[τ ] is increasing in
the initial technical risk, σ20, and decreasing in the systematic risk, s
2.
Proof: We continue the notation used in the proof of Proposition 9 and equation (59).
We write the expected timing of implementation assuming initial investment takes place,
(CV0 > 0), as





















which is proportional to
a′(π)b(π)− a(π)b′(π) (63)
Keeping in mind that b(π) > 0, the rest of the proof follows immediately by considering
whether a(π), the expected second period flow, is nonnegative and observations (a) - (c)
made in the proof to Proposition 9.
The effects of risk on the timing of implementation depend heavily on the sign of the
expected second period flow (as viewed at date zero). In the case where it is positive, then
the closer the second period assessment, µ1, is to its mean, µ0, the more likely investment will
take place in the second period. Therefore, increasing the sensitivity to the market signals
adversely affects the likelihood of investment in the second period. Accordingly, Proposition
10 states that increasing σ20 decreases the project duration. This happens because increasing
σ20 not only increases the learning sensitivity but also decreases the deterministic part of
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Table 2: Risk forces affecting project duration







No Agency 0 0 + +
Symmetric 0 - + ±
Asymmetric + - + ±
No
No Agency 0 0 - -
Symmetric 0 - - -
Asymmetric + - - ±
Technical
Yes
No Agency 0 0 - -
Symmetric 0 - - -
Asymmetric - - - -
No
No Agency 0 0 + +
Symmetric 0 - + ±
Asymmetric - - + ±
the second period flow, F ∗2 , with both effects resulting in a higher probability for second
period negative continuation value. Increasing the systematic risk results in two opposite
effects. On the one hand, the parties ability to learn diminishes and therefore the second
period quality assessment µ1 is less volatile, which increases the probability for second period
investment. On the other hand, increasing systematic risk results in a decrease in the second
period deterministic return, which decreases the probability for second period investment.
The net effect of these two forces depends on the specific values of the parameters.
When the expected second period flow is negative then the closer the second period
quality is to its mean the higher the probability for no investment. Now volatility increases
the probability for second period investment and therefore we get oppositive effects.
Recall, when there is asymmetric information, F ∗i is still decreasing in the technical
risk but is not necessarily increasing in systematic risk. Therefore, if ∆0 > 0, a(·) is
still decreasing in technical risk but it is unclear how a(·) changes with systematic risk,
and accordingly the net effect on project duration may change. Table 2 summarizes the
effects of risk on the timing of implementation for the different market settings (Asymmetric
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Information, Symmetric Information and No Agency).
4.3 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4 Since ∆0 = 0, we have by (3) and (23)
F ∗i = max
b1≥0







where Kc(bi) is independent of either σ20 or s
2. Let r represent either the technical or
systematic risk parameters, r ∈ {s2, σ20}, F ∗i (r) denote F ∗i for a given level of r, let Fi(bi, r)
be similarly defined and let b∗i (r) denote the optimal solution for a given level of r. Let
r1 < r2. Since the expression s2 +
s2σ20
s2+iσ20
is increasing in r we have that if λ > 0, Fi(bi, r1) >
Fi(bi, r2) for all bi. Thus,
F ∗i (r1) = Fi(b
∗
i (r1), r1) > Fi(b
∗
i (r2), r1) > Fi(b
∗
i (r2), r2) = F
∗
i (r2)
where the first inequality follows from the uniqueness of the optimal solution and the second
inequality follows from the observation that Fi(bi, r1) > Fi(bi, r2) for all bi. When λ = 0,
Fi(bi) is independent of either s2 or σ20, hence F
∗
i is independent of risk.






















































0 if not X.
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NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
Some of the questions we set out to investigate in this research cannot be answered ana-
lytically. Our analytical analysis is limited upfront by the lack of closed-form solution for
the deterministic path (e.g. investment, EN’s compensation). This problem is compounded
when we attempt to find explicit solutions for the continuation value and the project dura-
tion. Consequently, we must use numerical methods to overcome the limitations posed by
the analytical analysis and to this end we develop MATLAB code that simulates the model.
The greatest drawback of numerical analysis lies in the fact that the attained solutions
are valid only for the specific values of the parameters used in the analysis. Consequently,
any theoretical analysis based on these solutions is subject to the suspicion that it cannot
be generalized to other parametric values. Therefore, if the parameter values are not a true
reflection of empirical evidence and market behavior, the results of the numerical analysis
are less meaningful and may not lead to a serious theoretical discussion. It is therefore
imperative to set the parameter values so values given to the parameters be such that
they properly reflect empirical evidence on the market. Unfortunately, for many of the
parameters in our model there is no direct empirical findings that can help us set their
values. In these cases, we set the value of the parameters indirectly to empirical evidence
via a calibration process soon to be described. Using both the direct and indirect methods
we calibrate the model’s parameters and obtain a basic set of parametric values that closely
reflect the venture capital industry. Thus, we can be comfortable in using the model to
explain or predict other market phenomena.
The parameters we set directly to data are s2, the systematic risk, σ20, the initial technical
risk, µV C0 , the VC’s belief on the initial firm quality, and ∆0, the initial asymmetry in belief.
We normalize the initial firm termination value V0 to 1. We will refer to these parameters
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1. Compute deterministic path
2. Compute termination policy






Figure 10: Schematic overview of the numerical analysis
(including V0) as the data driven parameters. We set the basic values of these parameters
directly according to empirical evidence.
The remaining parameters λ, the EN’s risk aversion, γ and k, the parameters associated
with the EN’s disutility from effort, α and β, the parameters associated with the firm’s
production function, and L, the loss parameter, are calibrated to match a body of empirical
evidence as closely as possible. These parameters will hereafter referred to as the calibrated
parameters. Henceforward, we refer to these values as the basic values of the model.
The core code we develop to solve the model is therefore used in two different settings.
First, it is used in the calibration phase in which we solve the model for many parametric
values. Second, after we have set the basic values, we use the code to solve the model to
obtain economical results and predictions. Figure 10 describes this relationship between
the core code, the calibration and the numerical analysis processes.
In Section 5.2 we describe the core code’s components. In Section 5.3 we describe the
calibration process and in Section 5.4 we describe the numerical analysis results.
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5.2 The Core Code
The core code computes the solution to the model for a given value of the model’s parame-
ters. It is executed in three steps: (1) compute the “deterministic path”; (2) compute the
termination triggers; and (3) simulate the firm’s evolution (Monte Carlo simulation). We
now proceed to describe in detail each of these steps.
5.2.1 Computing the deterministic path
In this step we compute the equilibrium time paths associated with the EN’s risky compen-





results do not depend on the realization of the signals of project quality and are character-
ized in Theorem 1. Under our assumptions, the VC’s problem, (24), is strongly unimodal
and therefore we may easily compute the EN’s risky compensation, b∗i , via bisection search.
The c∗i and η
∗
i are computed directly from b
∗
i .
5.2.2 Computing the termination triggers
The continuation value CVi(·) at each date i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 is a continuous, increasing
function of µi (see Lemma 3). As a consequence (see Proposition 6), the optimal termination
policy is a trigger policy: the VC continues investment if and only if the project quality at
date i, µi, is greater than µ∗i , where CVi(µ
∗
i ) = 0. Given CVi(·) a simple bisection search
will determine the trigger µ∗i .
It remains to compute the continuation value function. Here, we generate a lattice
describing the evolution of the project’s quality over time. We now turn to describe in more
detail the project quality lattice, the way the continuation value is computed and issues
related with solution accuracy and computation time.
5.2.2.1 Lattice design
The lattice, depicted in Figure 11, simulates the evolution of the project quality. Each
column in the lattice represents a date in the life of the firm. At date 0 the project quality
is given by µ0. At following dates the quality may be one of many different states, depending


























µ1,n(1) = µ0,1 + κσ
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Date: 0 1 T-1r r r
Figure 11: Schematic overview of the quality lattice
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• n(i) denote the number of states at date i
• µi,j denote the firm’s quality at the jth state at date i, j = 1, ..., n(i).
The standard deviation of the project’s quality at date i, σµi , may be derived from equation





We design the lattice so that the maximal state at date i is κ standard deviations above the
maximal state at date i − 1 for some κ > 0; the minimum state is defined symmetrically.
That is,
µi,n(i) = µi−1,n(i−1) + κσ
µ
i−1 (74)
µi,1 = µi−1,1 − κσµi−1 . (75)
The remaining n(i) − 2 states are determined by setting their values to be equally spaced
between the minimum and maximum states. That is,
µi,j+1 = µi,j +
µi,n(i) − µi,1
n(i)− 1 for all j = 1..., n(i)− 1. (76)
5.2.2.2 Continuation value
The last column in the lattice represents the possible project quality states at date T − 1,
which is the last possible date for investment. At this point the continuation value is
independent of the future and can be computed explicitly using the deterministic path values
and the project quality. Thus, the terminal state µT−1,j corresponds to a continuation value,
denoted by CVT−1,j , according to:
CVT−1,j = µT−1,j + F ∗T−1 − lT−1 , (77)
where F ∗i is the optimal solution to the variable portion of the VC’s problem at date i, (24),
and li is the loss at date i.
To compute the continuation value for each state at date i < T−1 we proceed as follows.
Let Di,j denote the set of all states that are “immediate descendants” of µi,j—µi+1,k ∈ Di,j
if and only if µi+1,k is within ±κσµi from µi,j . We shall say the firm transitions from state
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. In case that µi+1,k is a minimal (maximal)
state we define µi+1,k−1 := −∞ (µi+1,k+1 := +∞). The transition probability pi,j,k from


















In the discrete approximation, the continuation value at state µi,j is given by:
CVi,j = µi,j + F ∗i − li +
∑
µi+1,k∈Di,j
pi,j,k max(CVi+1,k, 0) . (79)
Starting from (77) and working backwards through time in the familiar way, the continuation
values for all states and dates are computed. Since the true continuation value function is
continuous and increasing, we complete the approximation to CVi(·) via linear interpolation.
5.2.2.3 Computation time vs. solution accuracy
The accuracy of the triggers µ∗i computed in this step depends heavily on the number of
states in each column of the lattice as well as on κ, the parameter that determines the
range of firm quality represented in the lattice. In addition, the choice for the maximal
number of periods, T , affects not only the accuracy of µ∗i , but also affects on the accuracy
of the economic results of the model as compared to the infinite horizon solution. We let






1, if i = 0;
Mi, if i > 0.
(80)
The value of M is set to 50 and the value of κ is set to κ = 2.5. In the many experiments
we conducted, we found that an increase in M or κ or both did not change the value of
µ∗i (to within a 3% tolerance). With regard to the choice of T , Sahlman (1990) provides
empirical evidence there are at most 8 investment stages. We set T = 10. We note that
in almost all of the experiments we conducted, the probability of the firm surviving to the
10th period was less than 0.1%.
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5.2.3 Computing the model’s results
In the last step of the core code we compute the economic statistics of the model by conduct-
ing a Monte Carlo simulation of N firms. In each experiment we simulate the change in the
firm’s quality over time. As the firm evolves we compute statistics such as the EN’s payout,
and upon termination we compute statistics such as number of periods, total investment
and termination value. We set N = 100, 000. In the many experiments we conducted, we
found the results for expected net firm value, continuation value at date zero (expected net
VC share) and expected project duration did not change by more than 1% when N was
increased.
5.3 Calibration
We start the calibration process by setting values to the data driven parameters, s2, σ20, µ0
and ∆0. These parameters are set relative to V0, which has been normalized to 1. Next,
we set the values of the calibrated parameters α, β, γ, λ, k and L, through the calibration
process to be described below.
5.3.1 Data driven parameters
The values for the volatilities, σ20 and s
2, and the parameters relating to the potential per-
period gains if the parties took no action depend on the length of the period. Gompers
(1995) provides data for the amount of time between funding for different investment stages.
This data, provided in Table 3, reveals that the average time between investments for all
stages is approximately 1 year (1.09). Hereafter, we set the investment period’s length to
one year.




= rf + beta · rp, (81)
where r is required rate of return, rf is the risk-free rate, rp is the risk premium. Following
empirical findings by Kerins et. al. (2004) we set rf = 0.04, beta = 1, and rp = 0.06.
Accordingly, µ0 = 0.1V0 = 0.1.
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Table 3: Average time between funding for different investment stages
Industry Time to Next Funding Number of Investments
Seed 1.63 122
Startup 1.21 129
Early Stage 1.03 114
First Stage 1.08 288
Other Early 1.08 221
Expansion 1.26 377
Second Stage 1.01 351
Third Stage 0.86 181
Bridge 0.97 454
Parameters σ20 and s
2: The standard deviation in firm value is reported by Kerins et. al.
(2004), Table 4, to be 102%. We round this figure and assume that the initial standard





Further, we assume that the initial risk is equally divided between technical and systematic
risk. Thus, s2 = σ20 = 0.5.
Parameter ∆0: We believe the EN’s experience is the most important factor in determining
the asymmetry in beliefs parameter, ∆0, between the EN and the VC. A more experienced
EN is expected to be more reasonable and realistic and hold opinions similar to the VC.
We set ∆0 = 0.5V0 = 0.5.
5.3.2 Calibrated parameters
The calibrated parameters are α, β, γ, λ, k and L. The value of these parameters is set so
that the model’s output “best matches” empirical evidence described in Sahlman (1990) and
Gompers (1995). An explicit definition of “best match” is given as part of our description of
the calibration process. We start by explaining the difficulty associated with directly linking
the parameters in this group to empirical data. Subsequently, we describe the empirical
evidence, how we compute it in our model and the calibration process itself.
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• α and β: The parameters α and β represent the output elasticities of investment and
effort, respectively. We limit the values of α and β to α + β = 1 to model a constant
returns-to-scale production function. Different values of α, β describe different indus-
tries. Since the data we use to calibrate is cross-industry, the baseline values for α
and β must be calibrated.
• γ and k: No data is available from which to estimate the values for γ and k, the
parameters associated with the EN’s disutility from effort. Recall Assumption 2,
(1 − α) γβ ≥ 2. Since α + β = 1 we have γ ≥ 2. We set γ = 2 and calibrate k to the
data.
• λ: Setting a value for risk-averseness directly from data is difficult if not impossible.
Rabin and Thaler (2001), quoting Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), demonstrate that
attempting to do so may result in absurdly high levels of risk-aversion. They warn
researchers to be very careful when setting values to risk-aversion and conclude that
“economists should use care in choosing the appropriate hypothetical examples when
measuring risk aversion” (Rabin and Thaler (2001) p. 225).
• L: The loss function is assumed to be increasing and convex. Specifically, we model
the loss in period i to be
li = Li2 . (83)
As with γ and k, there is no empirical evidence from which to directly estimate the
loss parameter, L, and therefore it must be calibrated.
5.3.2.1 Empirical evidence
The empirical evidence that we use consists of seven economical statistics about the venture
capital industry reported by Sahlman (1990) and Gompers (1995). The average number of
investment periods is computed indirectly from Gompers (1995), Table IV, and is summa-
rized in Table 4. We conclude that:
1. The average number of rounds for all the firms is approximately 2.7.
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Table 4: Average number of investment rounds by industry
Industry Average Number of Rounds Number of Firms
Communications 2.78 98
Computers 3.89 27
Computer Related 3.66 90
Computer Software 2.99 77
Electronic components 3.27 22




Consumer products 2.14 103
Industrial products 2.09 89
Transportation 1.93 15
Other 1.60 96
Sahlman (1990, Figure 1) provides data about the distribution of the return from invest-
ment. Investments are divided into six groups. The first group contains all investments that
ended with total loss, the second group contains investments that ended with partial loss,
and the third, fourth, fifth and sixth groups comprise investments that returned a payoff
of between [0, 2], [2, 5), [5, 10) and [10,∞), respectively. Table 5 summarizes his empirical
findings. By merging adjacent groups we conclude that:
2. 34.5% of total investment resulted in a negative return.
Table 5: Investment categorized by return
Investments with return Percentage of Total Amount Invested
Total Loss 11.5%
Partial Loss 23.0%
0 to 1.999 30.0%
2 to 4.999 19.8%
5 to 9.999 8.9%
≥ 10 6.8%
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3. 49.8% of total investment resulted in a return between zero and five times the amount
invested.
4. 15.7% of total investment resulted in a return greater than five times the amount
invested.
Sahlman (1990, p. 485) also investigates the firm’s rate of success and he reports that:
5. 32.4% of the companies (70 of 216) failed to yield the amount invested.
6. 67.6% of the companies yielded more than the amount invested.
7. 4.28 is the ratio between the total value of the firms and the total amount invested
($1,049 million and $245 million, respectively).
We summarize the empirical evidence (EE) in the following array:
EE := (EE1, ..., EE7) = (2.7, 0.345, 0.498, 0.157, 0.324, 0.676, 4.28) . (84)
5.3.2.2 Code Outputs
In the simulation step of the core code we simulate a large number of firms. The statistics
that are gathered in the simulation process are then used to compute economical results
corresponding to the empirical evidence array, EE. Let
• N denote the number of simulated firms.
• τf denote the duration of firm f , f = 1, ..., N .
• Cf denote the total amount of investment in firm f .
• TVf denote the value at termination of firm f .
• Retf denote the return of firm f , Retf := TVf−V0−CfCf .




• I1 denote the sum of Cf ’s such that Retf ∈ (−∞, 0).
• I2 denote the sum of Cf ’s such that Retf ∈ [0, 5).
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• I3 denote the sum of Cf ’s such that Retf ∈ [5,−∞).
• N1 denote the number of firms such that Retf < 0
The model’s results are Res := (Res1, ..., Res7) where




2. the percent of total investment resulting with a negative return: Res2 := I1Inv
3. the percent of total investment resulted with a return in [0, 5): Res3 := I2Inv
4. the percent of total investment resulted with a return in [5,∞): Res4 := I3Inv
5. the percent of firms failing to return the investment: Res5 := N1N
6. the percent of firms succeeding to return the investment: Res6 := 1−Res5




In addition to the results computed for the calibration process, Res, described above,
the code computes other statistics to address a variety of research questions. Let:
• NFVf denote the net firm value of firm f , NFVf = TVf − Cf .




ai + bi(Vi − Vi−1)
)
• NV CSf denote the net VC share from firm f , NV CSf = TVf − ENPf − Cf .
• Nτ=t denote the number of firms with τf = t, t = 1, 2, ..., T .
In addition to Res, we compute:




2. The distribution of τ : P [τ = t] := 1N Nτ=t.








1The expected VC share is the VC’s continuation value
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5.3.2.3 The Calibration Process
The purpose of the calibration process is to determine the base values of the parameters
α, β, γ, λ, k and l. Keep in mind that we have already established the values of the other
parameters of the model and the calibration process takes them as given. The process starts
by setting a feasible range for each one of the parameters α, γ, λ, k and l. In the initial
search we start by allowing each parameter to receive one of n equally spaced points in the
parameter’s feasible range. Since we are calibrating 5 parameters we will have to examine
the economical results, Res, of each of the n5 possible experiments. For each one of these
n5 arrays we compute its sup-norm distance to the empirical evidence array EE. The best
match is the array Res that minimizes the sup-norm distance to the empirical evidence
array EE. Formally, let
• the `th parameter, ` = 1, ..., 5, denotes the calibrated parameters in the following order
(α, β, γ, λ, k, l)
• [rm` , rM` ] denotes the initial feasible range for parameter `.
• step` := r
M
` −rm`
n−1 denotes the search resolution for parameter `.
• (v1` , ..., vn` ) be n equally spaced points on the initial feasible range for parameter `,
where
– v1` = r
m
` ,
– vj+1` = v
j
` + step` for j = 1, ..., n− 1,
– vn` = r
M
` .
• V := (v11, ..., vn1 )× (v12, ..., vn2 )× · · · × (v15, ..., vn5 ) denotes the search space, and notice
the number of elements of V is n5.
• v ∈ V denotes a candidate value for the calibrated parameters, v = (v1, ..., v5)
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• Res(v) := (Res(v)1, ..., Res(v)7) denotes the model results corresponding to candidate
v.
Then the initial best match values are:









At this point we start an iterative search process centered around the initial best match.
In each iteration we define a grid around the current best match—in the first iteration the
current best match values are bmv—and search over the points of the grid. The distance
between points on the grid is divided by two from one iteration to the next, and the search
results of any iteration are set to be the new current best match. We repeat this process
iteratively, until we reach the desired accuracy for the basic values. The last iteration’s
results are the base values of the model.
We now formally describe this process. Let
• the current best match values, cbmv := bmv,
and repeat the following process 4 times:
1. the current best match values, cbmv := bmv.
2. the current step, cstep` := step` for each parameter `.




` ) be 3 equally spaced points around cbmv` for parameter `, which
• v1` = cbmv` − cstep`,
• v2` = cbmv`,
• v3` = cbmv` + cstep`.




1) × (v12, v22, v32) × · · · × (v15, v25, v35), and notice the
number of elements of V is 35.
5. Let v ∈ V denote a candidate value for the calibrated parameters, v = (v1, ..., v5).
res(v) := (res(v)1, ..., res(v)7) be the model results corresponding to candidate v.
Then the current best match values, cbmv := (cbmv1, ..., cbmv5) are given by (85).
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Table 6: The initial feasible regions and base values for the calibrated parameters
Parameter Region Base Values
α [0.1 , 0.9] 0.3875
β 1− α 0.6125
γ 2 2
λ [0.05 , 0.2] 1.0938
k [0 , 0.1] 0.1914
l [0.5 , 3] 0.0586
Table 7: Economic results of the calibration process
` Economic Result Resi EEi
1 expected number of periods 1.929 2.7
2 percent of total investment resulting with a negative return 0.247 0.345
3 percent of total investment resulting with a return in [0, 5) 0.56 0.498
4 percent of total investment resulting with a return in [5,∞) 0.194 0.157
5 percent of firms failing to return the investment 0.415 0.324
6 percent of firms succeeding to return the investment 0.585 0.676
7 total return from total investment 3.061 4.28
The base values for the calibrated parameters are contained in the vector cbmv produced
in the last iteration.
5.3.3 The Base Values
The initial feasible regions for the calibrated parameters are given in Table 6. The regions
were chosen in a trial and error process so that the initial base numbers are interior points.
Executing the calibration process on these regions with n, the number of points in the
initial grid, set n = 9 provided base values for the calibrated parameters as given in Table
6. The economic results, Res, are given in Table 7, which compares our models results to
the empirical evidence (EE). The distance of Res from EE is approximately 0.285, which
means that the largest deviation was less than 29%. To complete the picture we summarize
the base values for the data driven parameters in Table 8.
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We provide the multi-period model’s numerical results given for the basic numbers. Our
analysis focuses on finding how continuation value, project duration and net firm value
behave. We examine this behavior for changes in the risky components, sigma20 and s
2 and
for changes in the output elasticity to capital, α. Similarly to our risk analysis in Chapter
4, we find clear distinction between the effects of the systematic risk and the effects of
technical risk and demonstrate that these effects need not be monotone. In addition, we
find that for firms with constant returns-to-scale increasing the output elasticity of labor,
i.e. increasing β while maintaining α + β = 1, increases continuation value, firm duration
and expected net firm value.
5.4.1 Risk Analysis
Experimenting with the base numbers for different values of σ20 provides similar results to
those in the two period model. In the no agency and symmetric cases continuation value is
increasing whereas under asymmetric information the relationship is non monotonic. These
results are depicted in Figure 13, which describes the relationship between the continuation
value and the initial asymmetric risk for the three market settings.
Figure 12 depicts the dependency of firm value on the initial systematic risk. For the
symmetric and no agency market settings we have that firm value and the VC’s share
behave similarly. In both cases the dominant effect of the technical risk is to increase of the
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Figure 14: Expected firm duration vs. initial technical risk
∆0 > 0, the firm does not carry the losses to the VC’s share due to increases in technical
risk. Nevertheless, the firm is slightly affected by the VC’s loss, due to the decrease in
the expected number of investment periods. However, we find that for our base numbers
this negative secondary effect is negligible compare to the positive effect of the enhanced
sensitivity and consequently the asymmetric case is also increasing in Figure 12.
In contrast to technical risk, experimenting for different values of systematic risk on the
basic numbers results in a consistent decreasing behavior. Figures 15 and 16 depict the net
firm value and the expected VC share for the basic numbers when varying s2. We find that
even when ∆0 > 0 the negative net effects due to the loss of learning and the increase in
risk costs are dominant.
The main conclusion of the two-period model with regards to the effect of risk on the
timing of implementation is that it depends on the sign of the expected within period flow of
future periods. The loss function we use is quadratic form and, therefore, increases quickly
which makes the deterministic part of the within period flow negative very quickly. We
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Figure 15: Expected net firm value vs. market risk
with the systematic risk and increase with the initial technical risk. The complexity of
the T -period model in comparison to the two-period model is manifested in Figure 14
where we see that E[τ ] is initially decreasing with σ20 in contrast to the 2-period model
prediction. Notwithstanding, the T -period model results correspond very well to the two-
period predictions. We now examine how E[τ ] behaves in the presence of conflicting forces
such as when increasing s2 under symmetric or asymmetric information. In Figures 14 and
17 we present the expected project duration as a function of the initial technical risk and
the systematic risk, respectively, for the three market settings. We find a strong relationship
between project duration and the VC continuation value. Indeed, comparing Figure 14 with
Figure 13 reveals that the presence of strong conflicting forces allows for non-monotonic
behavior similar to the non-monotonic behavior measured for the continuation value.
5.4.2 Labor and Capital Substitution
The parameters α and β denote the returns to scale from capital and labor, respectively.
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Figure 17: Expected firm duration vs. market risk
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α + β = 1. Therefore, a firm with high α will have a low β and therefore enjoys a high
output elasticity to capital but a low output elasticity to effort. In this case we call the firm
capital elastic. Conversely, a firm with low α is capital inelastic. The numerical analysis
examines how firms with different capital elasticity behave. We find that asymmetry and
agency effects and VC’s ability to exploit EN’s optimism are more pronounced for capital
inelastic industries.
Figure 18 shows how the expected net firm value, changes with capital elasticity. The
expected net firm value is described for asymmetric beliefs, symmetric beliefs and for the no
agency case. In all market settings firm value declines with capital elasticity. Interestingly,
we have that for sufficiently high capital elasticity firm value is almost equal for all three
market settings. We explain these phenomena by noticing that the increase in termination





i , respectively) and an independent contributor (µi−1 − li). When the
firm is capital inelastic, EN’s effort comes “cheap” since the ratio between the cost of effort
and the return from effort (γ/β) is low and therefore the EN is willing to invest more effort.
This extra effort has a significant positive effect on the firm’s performance due to the high
returns from labor. Increasing α increases the relative cost of effort γ/β and discourages
the EN and consequently the VC from activity in the firm. At some point, however, the
change in the size of the contingent component is negligible compared to the independent
contributor to the termination value and the within period flow. Since firm value and the
continuation value are very much tied to the increase in termination value and the within
period flow, respectively, we claim that the effects of elasticity are similar for firm value and
continuation value, too. We also note the strong relationship between project duration and
continuation value. Accordingly, for high capital elasticity firms, since firm’s performance
is almost unchanged by α, we find similar results for its net value, the expected time to
implementation and the initial continuation value. This result is illustrate in Figures 18 -
20. For high α the graphs are almost constant.
The reason why firm value is almost identical for the asymmetric beliefs, symmetric
beliefs and no agency cases for sufficiently high α is explained by the relative high cost
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of effort. Agency and asymmetry costs are negligible compared to the high cost of EN
effort. Nevertheless, as one can see from Figure 19, the VC will always be able to exploit
the EN’s optimism, because the EN is effectively willing to forgo some of the firm’s gains
and hand it over to the VC. Notice that when α = 0.2 the VC “harvests” almost all the
asymmetry. With symmetric beliefs the VC’s continuation value is slightly above 0.61,
whereas with asymmetric beliefs (∆0 = 0.5) the VC’s continuation value increases by 0.44,
which is almost 90% ∆0. However, when α = 0.8 the VC gains less than 30% of ∆0 as result
of the asymmetric information. The reason for this is that for low capital elastic firms the
EN does not need to share the risk with the VC, which is implied by the high equilibrium
EN contingent compensation (b∗i ) values. Therefore, the EN is highly exposed to losses due
to asymmetric beliefs, hence the ability of the VC to fully exploit the asymmetry. However,
when there is high capital elasticity, the EN requires more risk sharing, and is therefore more
protected from losses due to the asymmetric beliefs. Finally, we note that in the asymmetry
case project duration is longer than the other market settings for high capital elastic firms
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Figure 20: Expected firm duration vs. capital elasticity
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CHAPTER VI
SHIFTING THE BARGAINING POWER
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we assumed that the VC has the bargaining power in negotiations
with the EN. We now examine the scenario where the EN has the bargaining power. For
tractability, this model requires the additional assumption that the parties agree upfront on
the number of investment periods, T and no early termination is possible. As the EN has
all the bargaining power, the time horizon T is chosen such that the EN’s expected utility
is maximized. Through our analyses in the previous chapters and this one, we hope to shed
more light on the effects of bargaining power on investments, labor supply and equilibrium
contracts.
6.2 The Model
Our model is similar to the one described in Chapter 3. However, we now assume that the
VC market is competitive and the EN possesses all the bargaining power in any negotiation
with the VC. As in the basic model, the VC has linear inter-temporal preferences whereas the
EN is risk-averse with CARA preferences. Since the EN possesses all the bargaining power,
in contrast with the previous model, the EN offers the VC a long-term renegotiation-proof
contract at date zero, which describes the VC’s investments, the EN’s compensation, and the
termination time, T . The contract between the VC and the EN, the VC’s investment policy,
the EN’s effort policy and the termination time are derived endogenously in a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the dynamic game between the VC and the EN.
As in the Basic Model, the project’s termination value, Vi, evolves as follows:
Vi − Vi−1 = ( cαi ηβi − li ) + Θ + Si.. (86)
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[ ai + bi(Vi − Vi−1)− kηγi ]
)} ]
. (87)
The conditions that we assumed on the parameters in the Basic Model are also assumed
to hold here. We now characterize the equilibrium.
6.3 Equilibrium
As before, we use backward induction to characterize the equilibrium. First consider the







T−1 given by (4) and (3), respectively, with the index i set to
T .
6.3.1 Optimal Contractual Parameters in Period T
Suppose that at the beginning of period T , i.e. (date T-1), the VC’s investment is c and the
EN’s contractual parameters are (a, b). If the EN exerts effort η in period T , his expected













a + b∆VT − kηγ
)}]
(88)
At date T − 1, that is, the beginning of period T ,
∆VT = cαηβ − lT + Θ + ST ,
where, according to the EN, Θ + ST ∼ N(µENT−1, σ2T−1 + s2). Since past decisions and signal



















where, recall, pT−1 = λ(σ2T−1 +s
2). Accordingly, the EN chooses his effort level to maximize:
bcαηβ − kηγ (90)







1Recall that E[exp{−λX}] = exp{−λ(µ̂− λ
2
σ̂2)} if X ∼ N(µ̂, σ̂2).
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Competition between the VCs ensures that
a = −c + (1− b)(cαη(b, c)β − lT + µV CT−1). (92)
Since the EN has all the bargaining power, the contractual parameters maximize the EN’s
expected continuation utility expressed in (88). Substituting (92) in (89) and taking expec-













where recall ∆T−1 := µENT−1−µV CT−1. Substituting the optimal effort (91) into (93) and consid-






















The problem (95) is, in fact, identical to problem (18). Since the assumptions on the
parameters used for the Basic Model still apply, we can use the results from the Basic












Hence, (95) can be expressed as
max
b
GT (b) := ∆T−1b− 12pT−1b
2 + Kc(b) (97)
where
K :=
(1− α)γ − β
αγ
> 0.
By the arguments used in the analysis of the Basic Model, Theorem 1 characterizes the
optimal risky compensation, b∗T , the optimal investment, c
∗




6.3.2 The inductive step
We note that b∗T , the solution to (97), is independent of past decisions. This observation
is critical to the analysis of the inductive step (i < T ). We will show going backwards
that each period’s decisions are independent of past decisions. Hence, in the inductive step
we need not consider how the current decisions (b, c, η) affect future decisions, (bt, ct, ηt),
t > i. Further, since at each future date competition between VC’s ensures they receive
zero return, they consider only the current period’s returns. Now, assume we are at the
beginning of period i < T . Suppose the VC investment is c and the EN’s contractual
parameters are (a, b). If the EN exerts effort η in period i, the relevant part of his expected















t ) + b
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as we need not consider past periods. Since ∆Vi = cαηβ−li+Θ+Si, the EN’s effort problem
is identical to the T period problem and the optimal effort is given by (91). Competition
between VC’s ensure
a(b, c) = −c + (1− b)(cαη(b, c)β − li + µV Ci−1), (99)
















At date i − 1, the VC’s future assessment of Θ, µV Ct−1, t > i, is a random variable. By (2)
and (4) it may be expressed as
µV Ct−1 =









s2 + (t− i)σ2i−1
. (101)
As the EN has the bargaining power and chooses the contract, the parameters b, c maximize
the EN relevant utility. Keep in mind, by the induction assumption, future optimal decisions
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(b∗t , c∗t , η∗t , t > i) are independent of b and c. Their only possible influence on the optimal
choices of b, c may be through the risk. To avoid burdening the reader, in each of the
following derivations we remove any expression that is irrelevant to the EN’s maximization
problem. Substituting ∆Vi, (86), and µV Ct−1 in the relevant expected utility (100), the EN’s






















s2 + (t− i)σ2i−1










where Zi is the sum of normal variables and hence, normally distributed. Recall, for nor-
mally distributed X, E[exp{λX}] = expλ(E[X]−12V ar[X]), and therefore to proceed we need
















because the VC is aware of the EN’s beliefs and so E[Θ|Gi−1] = µENi−1 . Notice now that
only Θ and Si are contained in risky expressions in Zi that also contain b or c. Therefore,
in computing the relevant variance of Zi we need only consider the variance of the risky







((1− b∗t )σ2i−1(t− i)









s2 + (t− i)σ2i−1
]
. (105)






((1− b∗t )σ2i−1(t− i)








































= (σ2i−1 + s
2)b2 + 2bσ2i−1(T − i). (109)









pi−1b2 + λσ2i−1(T − i)b (110)
and includes the immediate period’s cost of risk and the future cost that depends linearly
on the number of periods left. Considering (102), the relevant price of risk and since, the











The optimal investment is identical to the T period and is given by (96). Accordingly,
the EN’s maximization problem at the beginning of period i is
max
b
Gi(b) := (∆i−1 − λσ2i−1(T − i))b−
1
2
pi−1b2 + Kc(b) , (112)
Recall, bM ∈ (1, γβ ) is the point where c′′(b) = 0 (Proposition 1). The following proposition
ensures the solution to the EN’s maximization problem exists and is unique.
Proposition 11
Under Assumptions 1-3, each Gi(·) is strictly concave and hence strongly unimodal on
[0, bM ], and the solution to (112) is positive and less than bM .
The proof of Proposition 11 is identical to Proposition 3, hence omitted. Since the
EN’s maximization problem (112) is independent of past decisions, we can extend the
above arguments by backward induction to any period i and thereby derive the unique
equilibrium, as characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Characterization of Equilibrium)
Under Assumptions 1 - 3 the equilibrium contract offered by the EN and his effort in period
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T is characterized, as follows:
107
• The risky compensation is b∗i , the unique solution to (112);
• The investment is c∗i := c(b∗i ) defined in (96);
• The fixed compensation is a∗i := a(b∗i , c∗i ) defined in (99);
• The optimal effort level is η∗i := η(b∗i , c∗i ) defined in (91).
6.4 Analysis and Discussion
We now examine the effect of the shift in bargaining power on the EN’s risky compensation




i ). When the EN is risk-
neutral (λ = 0) or when there is perfect information (σ20 = 0,∆0 = 0), the EN’s objective
function, G(·) is identical to F (·), the VC’s objective function in the Basic Model. Hence,
the optimal solution is independent of who has the bargaining power.
Proposition 12
The deterministic path trajectories when the EN is risk neutral or when there is perfect
information are unaffected by whether the EN or the VC has the bargaining power.
The following theorem shows that the allocation of bargaining power does matter when
the EN is risk averse (λ > 0) and there is imperfect information.
Theorem 7 (Decreasing Contingent Compensation)
Suppose the EN is risk averse.
(i) Switching the bargaining power from the VC to the EN decreases the EN’s risky
compensation parameters (b∗i ) trajectory at all dates except the last for which the
contingent compensation is equal for both models.
(ii) If the EN is reasonably optimistic (∆0 ≤ p0) then switching the bargaining power from
the VC to the EN decreases the optimal investment (c∗i ) and effort (η
∗
i ) trajectories
at all dates except the last for which investment and effort are equal for both models.
If the risk averse EN has the bargaining power, then the efficiency of risk-sharing is reduced
so that the EN’s risky compensation path, his effort, and the VC’s investments are all
lowered.
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Recall b∗p is the solution in the perfect information case and that b∗p < 1 (Section 3.4.2).
For the Basic Model, Theorem 2 divides the value of ∆0 into three distinct regions. In
the first region, (∆0 ∈ [0, λσ2i−1b∗p) ), the EN’s compensation path is increasing. In the
second region, (∆0 = λσ2i−1b
∗
p), the EN’s compensation path is constant and in the third
region, (∆0 > λσ2i−1b
∗
p), the compensation path is decreasing. In the first and second region
investment and effort behave analogously to the EN’s compensation path. We now show
that the region of ∆0 for which the deterministic trajectories are increasing strictly contains
the corresponding region when the EN has bargaining power:
Theorem 8 (Increasing Trajectory Region)
If ∆0 ≤ λ(1 + bp)σ20 then the EN’s contingent compensation trajectory is increasing. If, in
addition, ∆0 ≤ λ(Tσ20 +s2) then the trajectories of investment and effort are also increasing.
The region of ∆0 for which investment, contingent compensation and effort are increasing
is considerably larger when the EN has bargaining power than when the VC has bargaining
power. This implies that the asymmetry in beliefs effects are much weaker when the EN
has bargaining power. In the Basic Model when ∆0 = λσ2i−1b
∗
p the simultaneous resolution
of asymmetry and technical risk results in a constant risk sharing over time. This result is
not replicated when the EN has bargaining power. Now, the effects of asymmetry are much
weaker and consequently the resolution of risk is the dominant force. Consequently, even
for relatively high levels of asymmetry we will see an increasing trajectory of contingent
compensation as the EN is assuming more and more risk in response to the decrease in
technical risk.
We now turn to consider parametric effects on the deterministic path:
Theorem 9 (Comparative Statics)
If ∆0 ≤ λ(Tσ20 + s2) then in any period the EN’s risky compensation, the EN’s effort and
the VC’s investment are increasing in the initial asymmetry in beliefs, ∆0, and decreasing
in the risk averseness, λ, the initial technical risk, σ20, the systematic risk, s
2, and the effort
parameter, k.
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By comparing Theorem 9 to the sensitivity of equilibrium theorems in the Basic Model
(Section 3.5) we find that the sensitivity results that were limited to the “reasonably opti-
mistic” region (i.e. ∆0 < λ(σ20 + s
2)) are now valid for a larger region. When the EN is in
charge, the effects of asymmetric beliefs are strongly mitigated in the early periods because
of the relatively high magnitude of the forces of the risk averseness. Consequently, for the
EN to be considered overtly optimistic his asymmetry needs to surpass a higher threshold
than in the Basic Model.
6.5 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 7: The derivative of the EN’s maximization problem, (112), is
G′i(b) := (∆i−1 − λσ2i−1(T − i))− pi−1b + Kc′(b) , (113)
Let bXi denote the contingent compensation at period i when X ∈ {V C, EN} has
bargaining power. By definition, F ′i (b
V C







i ) = −(T−i)λσ2i−1bV Ci . Unimodality of G(b) implies that bENi < bV Ci for any
i < T and bENT = b
V C
T , which establishes part (i). When ∆0 ≤ p0, by Proposition 2
bENi < b
V C
i ≤ 1 for any i < T and bENT = bV CT ≤ 1. Part (ii) now follows from the fact that
c(b) is strictly increasing on [0, 1) and that η(b, c) is increasing.
Proof of Theorem 8: Let x := ∆0
λσ20
. The derivative to the EN’s maximization problem,
(113), can be rewritten
G′i(b) := σ
2
i−1λ(x− (T − i)− b) −λs2b + Kc′(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F ′(b)
. (114)
Notice that by Proposition 11 Gi(b) and consequently, F (b) are strictly unimodal for all i.
We start by proving the first statement of the theorem when ∆0 ≤ λb∗pσ20, i.e. 0 ≤ x ≤ b∗p.
In Step 2 we prove for b∗p < x ≤ 1 + b∗p. In Step 3 we complete the proof for the second
statement.
Step 1: Suppose 0 ≤ x ≤ b∗p, Let i ∈ (2, ...T ) and let b∗i denote the optimal solution
in date i. By Theorem 2, when x ≤ b∗p the optimal solution when VC has bargaining
power lies below or equal to b∗p for all i and as a consequence of Theorem 7 we have that
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b∗i ≤ b∗p. Hence, by unimodality, F ′(b∗i ) ≥ 0. By definition, G′i(b∗i ) = 0 and therefore
σ2i−1λ(x− (T − i)− b∗i ) = −F ′(b∗i ) ≤ 0. Consider the EN’s problem at period i− 1:
G′i−1(b
∗
i ) = σ
2
i−2λ(x− (T − i + 1)− b∗i ) + F ′(b∗i ) (115)
= (σ2i−2 − σ2i−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
λ(x− (T − i)− b∗i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
nonpositive
−σ2i−2λ < 0. (116)
By unimodality, b∗i−1 < b
∗
i .
Step 2: Suppose b∗p < x ≤ 1 + b∗p. We start by establishing that the optimal solution at
period T maintains x − b∗T ≤ 1. At period T , GT (·) ≡ FT (·) and so by Theorem 2 we
have b∗T > b
∗
p and by unimodality, F




T ) = 0 and therefore
σ2T−1λ(x − b∗T ) = −F ′(b∗i ) > 0 and consequently, x > bT ∗. Since x ≤ 1 + b∗p we have that
x− b∗T ≤ 1 since b∗T > b∗p. Let i ∈ (2, ...T ) and let b∗i denote the optimal solution in date i.
Consider the EN’s problem in period i− 1:
G′i−1(b
∗
i ) = σ
2
i−2λ(x− (T − i + 1)− b∗i )− F ′(b∗i ) (117)
= (σ2i−2 − σ2i−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
less than σ2i−2
λ (x− (T − i)− b∗i )︸ ︷︷ ︸
less than 1
−σ2i−2λ < 0. (118)
By unimodality, bi−1 < b∗i .
Step 3: By (5) and (3), (and algebraic manipulation), ∆0 ≤ λ(Tσ0 + s2) implies ∆T−1 ≤
λ(σ2T−1 + s
2). Similarly to Proposition 2 we have that b∗T ≤ 1. Since, x < 1 + b∗p we have
from the previous steps of the proof that the optimal b are increasing over time and hence,
b∗i ≤ 1 for all i = 1...T . The rest of the proof follows immediately from the fact that c(b) is
strictly increasing on (0, 1) and η(b, c) is increasing.
Proof of Theorem 9: We begin by noting that for all i = 1, ..T , by Proposition 11 Gi(·)
is strictly unimodal on [0, bM ] and therefore Lemma 1 and its proof apply to Gi(·). Since
∆0 < λ(Tσ0 + s2), similarly to Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 8 we have that b∗i < 1 and






In the previous chapters we assumed that the EN’s effort choices are observable (but non-
contractible). In this chapter we relax this assumption and examine the scenario where
effort is unobservable. As in Chapter 6, we assume
• The VC market is competitive and the EN enjoys all the bargaining power.
• The timing of termination, T , is decided upfront at date zero.
The basic model is as described in Chapter 6, but we now assume that the EN’s effort
cannot be observed by the VC. The EN’s assessment of project quality is still given by (3)
and (4). However, the VC’s learning now depends on his conjectures about the EN’s effort
in past periods. Specifically, if at the beginning of period i the VC conjectures the EN’s past
effort choices are (η̂1, ..., η̂i−1) then her posterior distribution on Θ is N(µV Ci , σ
2
i ), where
µV Ci = µ
V C
i (η̂1, ..., η̂i−1) =










The EN’s information at any date is identical to the previous models. However, the VC’s
information set is now changed to exclude knowledge of the previous effort choices of the
EN. We denote the EN and the VC’s information set the beginning of date i by GENi−1 and
GV Ci−1 , respectively. Clearly, GV Ci ⊂ GENi .
The dynamics of the equilibrium are similar to the Shift of Power Model with the
exception that the EN and the VC have different information sets. Specifically, we assume
that for any contract offer the EN responds in effort levels that take into account the fact
the VC cannot observe the true effort but instead may conjecture them. Generally, the EN’s
effort may depend on the contract offer and the VC’s conjectures. That is, η = η(a, b, c, η̂).
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The VC, on the other hand, must provide the EN with the most appealing contract. The
VC, however, is aware of the EN’s effort best response and therefore his conjecture with
regard to the effort also depends on his choice of contract, i.e. η̂ = η̂(a, b, c). In equilibrium,
the VC conjectures correctly and matches his conjecture to the EN’s effort function (i.e.
η̂(a, b, c) = η(a, b, c, η̂(a, b, c)))1. This equilibrium conjecture is used by the VC in order
to maximize the EN’s utility. To simplify the exposition of the equilibrium, we begin by
developing the solution for a two-period model.
7.2 Two-Period Model
As usual, we use backward induction to derive the equilibrium. For given contractual
parameters (b, c) the EN’s utility for a choice of effort level η in the second period is








where a1, b1, c1 and η1 are the first period decisions. Since ∆V2 = cαηβ − l2 + Θ + S2, the

















Competition among VCs ensures that the VC’s offer guarantees her zero expected return.
−c + (1− b)E[∆V2|GV C1 ]− a = 0 , (123)
which implies:
a = −c + (1− b)(cαη(b, c)γ + E[Θ|GV C1 ]− l2) . (124)
At date 1, the VC’s assessment of Θ, E[Θ|GV C1 ], depends on his conjecture about the EN’s
first period’s effort. By (119)
E[Θ|GV C1 ] = µV C1 (η̂1) =
s2µV C0 + σ
2
0(∆V1 − cα1 η̂1 + l1)
s2 + σ20
. (125)
1In fact, we will show that η = η(a, b, c) and therefore the equilibrium condition about the conjecture
is trivially set as η̂(a, b, c) = η(a, b, c). Since the EN’s actions are independent of the conjectures, the
conjectures need not be common knowledge.
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Therefore,
a = a(b, c) := −c + (1− b)(cαη(b, c)γ − l2 + µV C1 (η̂1)
)
. (126)
Substituting a(b, c) in the EN’s utility, (121), where now we consider the VC’s information














Since the VC’s objective is to maximize the EN’s utility he must consider the EN’s beliefs
about the project’s quality. The VC’s conjectures about past investment are consistent with
(125) and so, in (127), E[Θ|GV C1 ] is given by
E[Θ|GV C1 ] = µEN1 (η̂1) =
s2µEN0 + σ
2
0(∆V1 − cα1 η̂1 + l1)
s2 + σ20
. (128)
Notice that the asymmetry in beliefs under the VC’s information set GV C1 satisfies
µEN1 (η̂1)− µV C1 (η̂1) = ∆1 , (129)
where ∆1 is defined in (5). Taking the expectation of (127) and removing irrelevant expres-













where, in the above, we substitute E[Θ|GV C1 ]−µV C1 (η̂1) according to (129). The rest of the








2 + Kc(b) , (132)
where K and K̂ are positive constants. We denote the optimal solution in the second
period by b∗2 and the corresponding optimal risk free compensation, investment and effort
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2), respectively. We also note the second
period optimal solution is independent of first period decisions.
In the first period, for contract (a, b), investment c and effort level η, the EN’s expected











Substituting a∗2 according to (126) and ∆Vi, i = 1, 2, according to (86), the EN’s expected







(a + b(Θ + cαηβ + S1 − l1)− kηγ)















a + b(Θ + cαηβ + S1 − l1)− kηγ
− c∗2 + (1− b∗2)(c∗2αη∗2β +
s2µV C0 + σ
2
0(Θ + c
αηβ + S1 − cαη̂β1 )
s2 + σ20
− l2)








Removing irrelevant terms, the EN’s effort problem is
max
η
















By the above analysis, given the VC’s conjecture of the EN’s effort η̂1, η(b, c) is the
EN’s best response. In particular, the EN’s best response is independent of the market’s
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conjecture. The VC’s contract offer anticipates the EN’s best response and therefore the
VC’s conjecture about the EN’s effort depends on b and c as well. In equilibrium, the
VC’s conjecture equals the EN’s best response. Since, however, the EN’s best response is
independent of the VC’s conjecture we trivially set
η̂1 = η(b, c). (139)
Competition among the VC’s guarantees the contract satisfies
−c + (1− b)E[∆V1|GV C0 ]− a = 0 (140)
and therefore
a(b, c) = −c + (1− b)(cαη(b, c)β + µV C0 − l1). (141)
The contract maximizes the EN’s expected utility (135). After substituting a(b, c) into







−c+(1−b)(cαη(b, c)β+µV C0 −l1)+b(Θ+cαη(b, c)β+S1−l1)−kη(b, c)γ +
− c∗2 + (1− b∗2)(c∗2αη∗2β +
s2µV C0 + σ
2
0(Θ + c
αη(b, c)β + S1 − cαη̂β1 )
s2 + σ20
− l2)




β + S2 − l2)− kη∗2γ
)} ∣∣∣ GV C0
]
. (142)












+ b∗2(Θ + S2)
)} ∣∣∣ GV C0
]
. (143)
We denote the exponent term in (143) by λZ and note that since Z is the sum of normal
variables it is normally distributed, too. To compute the relevant expectation of the VC’s
maximization problem we need to consider the relevant parts of E[Z|GV C0 ] and V ar[Z|GV C0 ].
Since the VC is maximizing the EN’s expectation, E[Θ|GV C0 ] = µEN0 and the relevant
components of E[Z|GV C0 ] that affect the decision variables b and c are
−c+cαη(b, c)β+µV C0 +b(E[Θ|GV C0 ]−µV C0 )−kη(b, c)γ
= φ(B1(b))c
α γ
γ−β − c + ∆0b, (144)
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where we obtain (144) by substituting optimal effort according to (137) similarly to the
analysis in the Basic Model. The relevant risky components are those that multiply current
period’s decisions, in this case Θ and S1. Accordingly, the relevant variance of Z is
(
b + (1− b∗2)
σ20








b + (1− b∗2)
σ20
s2 + σ20︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1(b)
)2
· V ar[S1|GV C0 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
s2





2(s2 + σ20)− 2B1(b)b∗2s2
)
. (145)





γ−β − c + ∆0b− λ2
(
(B1(b) + b∗2)
2(s2 + σ20)− 2B1(b)b∗2s2
)
. (146)
The optimal investment is c(B1(b)) where c(·) is given by (131). Since B1(b) is of the form
B1(b) = b + Constant,
we can
• replace the term ∆0b in (146) with ∆0B1 and
• maximize over B1 := B1(b) instead of b.
We therefore rewrite the optimal contract problem as
max
B1
Kc(B1) + ∆0B1 − λ2
(
(B1 + b∗2)
2(s2 + σ20)− 2B1b∗2s2
)
. (147)




Kc(B1) + ∆0B1 − λ2B
2
1(s
2 + σ20) + B1(∆0 − λb∗2σ20). (148)
The optimal solution satisfies 0 < B∗1 < b
∗
2 (we prove this for the T -period model). If
we assume the EN is realistically optimistic (∆0 < p0) then 0 < b∗2 < 1.
2 Therefore, the











and may be negative.
2Recall results from the Basic Model and, in particular, Proposition 2.
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7.3 T-period Model
We use backward induction to characterize the equilibrium contract. As in the two-period
model, we show the decisions in each period are independent of the past. In addition,
competition in the VC market ensures that, in each period, the VC’s expected return
equals zero. We formalize the induction assumptions at the beginning of period i. Suppose
the EN’s contractual terms in period i are a, b, c and the EN’s effort is η. Let (a∗t , b∗t , c∗t , η∗t )
denote the optimal decisions in future periods, t, T ≥ t > i.
1. Future decisions are independent of the current decision. That is, (b∗t , c∗t , η∗t ) are
independent of (b, c, η), T ≥ t > i.





t ) = −c∗t + (1− b∗t )E[∆Vt|GV Ct−1 ], T ≥ t > i. (149)
3. The optimal effort, η∗t := η(B∗t , c∗t ), and the optimal investment, c∗t := c(B∗t ), T ≥ t > i








s2 + (j − 1)σ20
. (150)
We now describe the optimal contractual parameters in period i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T . Suppose
that at the beginning of date i the EN’s contractual parameters are (a, b) and the VC’s















t ) + b
∗




The fixed portion of the EN’s compensation at(b∗t , c∗t ), depends on the VC’s conjectures
about the EN’s prior effort choices. Specifically, suppose that the VC’s conjectures about
past EN effort are (η̂1, ..., η̂t−1). Then
E[Θ|GV Ct−1 ] = µV Ct−1 (η̂1, ..., η̂t−1) :=










s2 + (t− 1)σ20
. (152)
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Substituting at(b∗t , c∗t ), t > i and ∆Vt, t ≥ i, according to (149) and (86), respectively, and





























Keep in mind at the beginning of period i, for t > i, (152) can be rewritten













and the only relevant component of µV Ct−1 (η̂1, ..., η̂t−1) to the EN’s effort problem is the one
containing the current period’s effort, η. We disregard irrelevant terms and rewrite the
EN’s effort problem, (153)
max
η






s2 + (t− 1)σ20
. (155)













s2 + (t− 1)σ20
. (157)
Notice that the EN’s optimal effort choice does not depend on the VC’s conjectures of her
prior effort choices. The VC is aware the EN’s best effort response in each period t ≥ i
depends on the tth period contract offer (at, bt, ct). Therefore, his current and future conjec-
tures (η̂i, ..., η̂T−1) depend on the contract offer. Since, however, by (156) and the inductive
assumption, the EN’s effort does not depend on the VC’s conjectures, in equilibrium, the
VC’s anticipation of the EN’s effort in the current and future periods is correct and satisfies
(










Due to perfect competition among VCs, (149) holds true for the current period as well.
Hence,
a(b, c) = −c + (1− b)(cαη(b, c)β + µV Ci−1 (η̂1, ..., η̂i−1)− li). (159)
The optimal contract maximizes the EN’s expected utility. We substitute a according to
(159) in the EN’s expected utility, (153), and remove irrelevant expressions. The contractual





















Substituting η(b, c) and µV Ct−1 (η̂1, ..., η̂t−1) according to (156) and (152), respectively, and



































In what follows, it is more convenient to express the optimal contract problem in terms of
Bi rather than directly b. To compute the expectation of (161) we need to find the relevant
mean and the relevant variance. Since the VC is maximizing the EN’s utility according to
the EN’s beliefs,
E[Θ|GV Ci−1] = µV Ci−1 (η̂1, ..., η̂i−1) :=



















The relevant risky components of (161) are the risky components that are in expressions
containing b or c. Therefore, the only relevant risky components are Θ and Si (but not Sj
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((1− b∗t )(t− i)σ20




















where B∗t is given by (150) for the optimal level at date t. We show the derivation of (164)








+ s2B2i , (165)



























The optimal investment, c(Bi), is given by (131). Since Bi = b + Constant we can replace















We denote the optimal solution by B∗i .
Recall, bM ∈ (1, γβ ) is the point where c′′(b) = 0 (Proposition 1). The following propo-
sition ensures the solution to the EN’s maximization problem exists and is unique.
Proposition 13
Under Assumptions 1-3, each Hi(·) is strictly concave and hence strongly unimodal on
[0, bM ], and the solution to (168), B∗i , is positive and less than bM .
The proof of Proposition 13 is identical to Proposition 3, hence omitted. Since the
current period’s maximization problem and the other decision variables in period i satisfy
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the induction assumptions we can extend the above arguments by backward induction to
any period i and thereby derive the unique equilibrium, as characterized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 10 (Characterization of Equilibrium)
Under Assumptions 1 - 3 the equilibrium contract offered by the VC and the EN’s effort in
period i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T is characterized, as follows:
• The risky compensation is b∗i = B∗i −
T∑
t=i+1





• The investment is c∗i := c(B∗i ) defined in (131);
• The fixed compensation is a∗i := a(b∗i , c∗i ) defined in (159);
• The optimal effort level is η∗i := η(B∗i , c∗i ) defined in (156).
7.4 Analysis and Discussion
We first characterize the trajectory of the Bi’s.
Proposition 14 (B∗i Trajectory Region)
Suppose the EN is reasonably optimistic (∆0 < p0)
(i) The trajectory of B∗i increasing.
(ii) B∗i ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ T ;
Proposition 14 is significant since the optimal investment and effort behave according to
B∗i . When effort was observable, the EN’s effort level was tied directly to his current period’s
contingent compensation. Now, however, effort depends on future contingent compensation
as well.
We now turn to examine how optimal effort and investment levels compare to the Basic
Model and the Shift of Power Model.
Theorem 11
Suppose the EN is realistically optimistic (∆0 < p0). Prior to the last period, the effort
level η∗i , and the investment level, c
∗
i , in each period are less than the effort and investment
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levels in the Basic Model but are more than the effort and investment levels in the Shift of
Power Model, respectively. In the last period investment and effort levels are identical for
the three models.
Investment is monotonically increasing in the EN’s contingent incentives (whether they are
b∗i as in the previous models or B
∗
i as in our current model) as long as the EN is reasonably
optimistic. Consequently, and assuming the EN is reasonable, increasing the contingent
incentives to the EN increases the amount of investment. The EN’s effort, which is induced
by both the investment incentives and the contingent incentives, will behave similarly and
increases with the contingent incentives.
7.5 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 14: The derivative of the EN’s maximization problem, (168), is
H ′i(B) := ∆i−1 − λσ2i−1
T∑
t=i+1
B∗t − pi−1B + Kc′(B) . (169)




i ) = 0. Notice that H
′
i−1(B) =
H ′i(B)−λσi−1B∗i . Since by Proposition 13 B∗i > 0 we have H ′i−1(B∗i ) < 0 and by unimodal-
ity B∗i−1 < B
∗
i , which completes the proof to part (i). For period T , HT (·) ≡ F1(·) and
applying Proposition 2 we have B∗T < 1. The rest of the proof now follows from part (i).
Proof of Theorem 11: Let bXi denote the contingent compensation at period i when
X ∈ {V C, EN} has bargaining power (observable effort). We start by showing that for all




i . We note that:














By definition, F ′i (b
V C




i ) = 0. Since by Propositions 13 and 14 0 < B
∗
i < 1,
we have H ′i(b
V C











the EN is realistically optimistic, by Proposition 2 bV Ci < 1. Since investment and effort
are identical functions for the three models and are increasing (since b < 1) we have the
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investment and effort ordered in an identical manner. The second statement immediately
follows from the fact HT (·) = GT (·) = FT (·).
Derivation of Equation 164: Let
xt := (1− b∗t )
σ20


























s2 + (t− 1)σ20
]
,
the right hand side term of (163). It is therefore left to show the left hand side terms of
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In this thesis we presented a model that incorporates key features of the venture financing
process. Our model features staged investment, allows for contingent and risk-free compen-
sation to the EN and considers costs of VC oversight. The VC’s capital inflow commitment
must be coupled with human capital investment by the EN. Another central feature of our
model is the learning about the project’s quality. We tested our model under different con-
flict scenarios between the VC and the EN including asymmetry in attitude towards risk
and asymmetric beliefs about the project. In addition, we tested our model for different
bargaining power assumptions and informational asymmetries.
Our research incorporates and explains empirical evidence about the VC-EN relation-
ship. More importantly, we make predictions about the true meaning of empirical evidence.
For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find that pay-performance sensitivity of CEO’s
increase over time. We find similar findings. We predict, however, that this phenomena will
happen only when the asymmetric beliefs between the VC and the EN are not too large.
We also predict that it is more likely to happen when the EN has bargaining power.
We endogenously derive a milestone financing policy and find that the milestones are
increasing with risk-averseness and decreasing with the asymmetry in beliefs. We also
predict that the VC will benefit from an EN’s optimism, which he can exploit.
Using a two-period version of our Basic Model, we conduct a full risk analysis and
demonstrate the distinct effects of technical risk and market risk. Calibrating our model
to empirical data enables us to conduct a more meaningful numerical analysis. The most
significant conclusion from this analysis is that the two-period results are extended to the
T -period model and that systematic risk and technical risk have opposite effects on the
firm. Systematic risk is associated with decreasing payoffs to the VC, less firm value and
shorter project duration. Conversely, technical risk is associated with future promise and
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increases the VC payoff, firm value and project duration.
We predict that with a constant-return-to-scale production technology, increasing the
labor output elasticity increases the firm’s value, duration and appeal to the VC.
We examine the effects of asymmetric information by assuming the VC cannot observe
the EN’s effort. In this setting, we show that the EN receives more incentives to exert effort.
More capital and human investment takes place.
There are a number of possible extensions to our research.
• VC oversight is a central feature in VC finance. There is empirical evidence about
the positive effects of the VC’s advice to the EN. In addition, researchers have shown
that this advice requires considerable resources form the VC. In the current model we
assume the VC’s oversight is exogenous. An alternative model could consider a double-
sided moral hazard formulation that allows the VC’s monitoring costs and oversight
to be determined endogenously. This approach may provide insight to explain how
VC oversight behaves and address questions such as: When do we expect to see more
VC oversight and when less? Will asymmetric beliefs allow VC to invest less resources
in oversight? How does the EN’s degree risk aversion affect oversight?
• Another way of introducing richness to the moral hazard problem in our model is by
relaxing the assumption that the VC is a single entity. A more elaborate description
of the VC will distinguish between the investors in the venture fund and the VC fund
managers who interact directly with the EN. Incorporating this feature into our model
will enable an improved understanding of the full scope of the VC finance process.
Why do venture funds have a limited investing horizon? Why are VC funds structured
as limited partnerships? How should the fund investors optimally compensate the VC
fund manager? Do the answers to these questions depend on the VC-EN relationship?
• Our investigation of the effects of the bargaining power is limited to examining two
extreme cases in which either the VC or the EN possesses all bargaining power. Under
this assumption, we found that the deterministic path trajectories are lower when the
EN has bargaining power. However, we do not know how the deterministic paths
127
behave when bargaining power is divided somewhere between the EN and the VC.
Future research may incorporate a bargaining model that allows bargaining power to
be shared between the parties. This will enable a more meaningful analysis of the
effects of bargaining power.
• The stopping time in the Shift of Power and the Non Observable Effort models is
determined upfront. Further research could allow one to relax this assumption and
allow a dynamic investment policy with a random stopping time as in the Basic Model.
This will enable one to examine how bargaining power and effort observability affect
project duration.
• Our model may be generalized to a strategic management decision analysis model.
As the firm’s manager, the EN must allocate available resources between marketing
and product improvement. The EN’s allocation considerations may be influenced by
project risks and by his ability to signal potential VC’s about the project’s potential.
• The contracts we assume in our model allow for per-performance sensitivities and risk
free payments to the EN. By introducing explicit compensation securities it could be
possible to better address specific empirical evidence about the EN’s compensation
schemes.
• In our model, we limit asymmetry in beliefs to µ0, the assessment of project quality.
Introducing asymmetry in belief about the risk of the project will enable a further
understanding of both the effects of asymmetric beliefs and the effects of risk.
• There is no quantitative empirical evidence about asymmetric beliefs and EN risk
aversion. Most theoretical models assume the EN is risk averse. In contrast, anecdotal
empirical evidence has led other researchers to consider EN’s as risk-takers (Cave and
Minty (2004)). Our model predicts a tradeoff between the effects of risk aversion
and asymmetric beliefs that explains this contradiction. Many researchers conjecture
(Sahlman (1990), Gladstone and Gladstone (2002) among others) the EN is very
optimistic. Empirical research based on our model could attempt to quantify and
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differentiate between these two features of the VC-EN relationship.
In closing, we believe our research contributes to the understanding of the multi-faceted





The Matlab code contains a number of of files, which we group into 6 modules, described
below. In addition to these modules, there is a file containing the all the parameters that
control the experimentation or calibration processes. In this way, to conduct an experiment
or run a calibration process one need change only the parameters gathered in this file.
• Module 1: Main Program. This is module managing the numerical experiments. It
produces an experiment scenario (i.e. assigned values to the parameters) and activates
the other modules of the program.
• Module 2: Deterministic Path. This module produces the deterministic path results
of the model.
• Module 3: Dynamic Evaluation. This module computes the continuation value for
each state of the lattice and the trigger termination policy and the economic statistics.
• Module 4: Lattice Construction. This module generates the lattice representing the
evolution of the state variable µV Ci .
• Module 5: Result Presentation. Displays the deterministic and simulation results.
• Module 6: Calibration. This module manages the calibration of the parameters. It
creates the experiment scenarios to be tested in the calibration process and activates
the other modules of the program.
In the next section we describe the parameters of the code, given in the file. In Section
A.3 we described the rest of the files of the code.
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Table 9: Model parameters
alpha α the capital elasticity
gamma γ
gambet γβ
k effort k, effort parameter
lambda λ, risk aversion
s risk s2, market risk
sigma 0 σ0, initial technical risk
Delta 0 ∆0, Initial asymmetry
V 0 V0, Initial termination value
mu o µV C0 , initial VC assessment of project quality
loss1 parameter L from loss formula li = Lix
loss2 x from loss formula
A.2 Code Parameters - Parameters.m
In the file Parameters.m , we conveniently gather all the parameters that control the out-
put of the code. The user of the code need only access these parameters when wanting to
conduct an experiment or multiple experiments involving a change in one of the model’s
parameters or a calibration process. All variables on this file are global and unless stated
otherwise, all variables are a single-cell. We group the parameters into four groups, model
parameters, programming parameters, multiple experiment parameters and calibration pa-
rameters.
A.2.1 Model Parameters:
The model parameters are described in Table 9. We point out that β does not appear
because to solve the model we do not need both β and γ but rather their ratio, γβ .
Programming Parameters:
The programming parameters include all the parameters that control the lattice struc-
ture, the monte carlo simulation and the display of the results. These parameters are
summarized in 10.
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Table 10: Programming parameters
T T , Maximum number of periods
num states The number of nodes in date 1 (end of first period)
states inc Number of nodes added every date after date 1
std inc
Number of standard deviations added to the extreme
lattice values in each period
sim num
Number of simulation runs to be executed in the
Monte Carlo simulation
display zero
Indicating whether ZERO DISPLAY or ALL DATES
DISPLAY or both.
display type
Indicating which of the lattice dynamic values be dis-
played.
val num Number of dynamic values stored in each node.
dynamic names Contains the labels of the lattice dynamic values.
There are two formats of the lattice display: ZERO DISPLAY and ALL DATES DIS-
PLAY. ZERO DISPLAY will contain ALL lattice dynamic values but only for date zero,
whereas ALL DATES DISPLAY displays results for all dates but the results can be limited
through the parameters display type.
display zero: If equal 0 then only ZERO DISPLAY will be displayed. If equal 1 then
both ZERO DISPLAY and ALL DATES DISPLAY. If equal 2 then only ALL DATES
DISPLAY is displayed.
Keep in mind that date ZERO DISPLAY is a complete lattice display and will contain
all dynamic values regardless of the values of display type. These parameters only affect
ALL DATES DISPLAY in the following manner:
dynamic names and display type are arrays of the size [1 X val num]. Each element in
display type is either 1 or 0. An entry of 1 in the ith location indicates that the ith dynamic
value is to be displayed in the lattice display. The dynamic values are given according to
the following order:
1. State value (µi);
2. Continuation value.
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Table 11: Multiple experiment parameters
mult flag Indicating whether multi- or single-experiment scenario.
mult param Indicating the variable parameter - see below.
mult values An array consisting of the values of the var parameter.
Table 12: Calibrations parameters
calibration Indicating whether calibration process or not.
num values The number of values we are searching on.
cal limits The initial feasible region for the calibrated parameters.
output val The empirical evidence data for the calibration.
Remark: To add dynamic values capabilities the following actions are needed: 1. Increase
parameter val num. 2. Add an entry to the parameter display type 3. Update the functions
Values to support the computation of the new dynamic value.
Multiple Experiment Parameters:
The parameters controlling the multiple experiment scenario are provided in Table 11
If mult flag =1 then the program executes a multi-experiment scenario, whereas zero
indicates a single-experiment. In a multi-experiment scenario we allow one of the model
parameters to change. The variable parameter is given by mult param according to the fol-
lowing rule: 1 = alpha, 2=gambet, 3=k effort, 4=lambda, 5=s risk, 6=sigma 0, 7=Delta 0,
8=V 0, 9 = mu 0, 10=loss1, 11=loss2, 12=d disc. The values the variable parameter re-
ceives are stored in mult values. The size of mult values depends on the number of experi-
ments desired.
Calibrations Parameters:
The parameters of the calibration process are provided in Table 11
If calibration =1 then the program is running the calibration process instead of the
regular single or multi experiment. This parameter affects the type of display. For example,
in a calibration scenario we do not display the deterministic path, the lattice display nor
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the trigger policy.
In the initial step of the calibration process the calibration grid is a five dimensional
grid (each dimension representing one of the calibrated parameters - α, γ, k, L and λ). The
number of points on each dimension is num values and these points are equally spaced
between the lower limit and the upper limit of the initial feasible region for the dimension’s
parameter. The initial feasible regions for the calibrated parameters is stored in cal limits
in the following order: alpha,gamma,k effort,loss2 and lambda. The size of cal limits is [2
X 5], where the first column is the lower limit and the second column is the upper limit.
EE = EE1, ..., EE7), the empirical evidence used in the calibration process, defined in
Section 5.3.2.1, is stored in output val. The size of output val is [1 X 7]
A.3 Module Design
Unless stated otherwise, all data structures in each subroutine/function are private to the
subroutine/function itself.
A.3.1 Module 1 - Main Program
File List:
1. Program.m
2. UpdatePar.m contains the function UpdatePar
3. ExecProg.m contains the function ExecProg
Detailed Description:
• Program.m : We allow for either a single-experiment execution or a multiple-experiment
execution of the program. Program reads the parameters’ values via Parameters, and
then either executes a multi-experiment program or a single-experiment program. In
a multi experiment scenario we allow (exactly) one of the model parameters to receive
different values. The function UpdatePar sets the new value of the variable parame-
ter. The number of experiments is equal to the size of mult values, which contains the
different values the variable parameter receives.
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• UpdatePar(i): In the multi-experiment setting, the variable parameter’s value must
be updated for each experiment. UpdatePar.m handles this. The function’s parame-
ter, i, is the experiment number.
• ExecProg(experiment): For experiment number experiment, ExecProg computes
and displays the deterministic path and the dynamic values. Note that in a single-
experiment setting experiment = 1.
A.3.2 Module 2 - Deterministic Path
File name DetPath.m contains the following functions:
• DetPath : The Main function in the file. This function takes no arguments and
returns seven arrays that contain the deterministic path results. The arrays are optb,







and σi−1], respectively. These arrays are global and each is of the size [1 X T ], where
recall, T is the number of periods.
The following utility functions are used to generate the deterministic path results.
• BisectionSearch(sigmai,Deltai): Computes b∗i . The arguments sigmai and Deltai are
σ2i−1 and ∆i−1, respectively.
• VCproblemDeriv(b,sigmai,Deltai): Computes F ′i (b). The arguments sigmai and Deltai
are σ2i−1 and ∆i−1, respectively.
• VCproblemFunc(b,c,i,sigmai,Deltai): Computes F (b). The arguments sigmai and
Deltai are σ2i−1 and ∆i−1, respectively. The argument c denotes c
∗
i
• LossFunc(i): Computes li.
• Investment(b): Computes c(b).
• DerivInvestment(b): Computes c′(b).
• Effort(b,c): Computes η(b, c)
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A.3.3 Module 3 - Dynamic Evaluation
File List:
1. DynamicVal.m contains the function DynamicVal
2. Values.m contains the function Values
3. MuStar.m contains the function MuStar
4. TestRes.m contains the function TestRes
Detailed Description:
• DynamicVal(i): It runs from the last period backwards until date i and computes
the values associated with each state. It returns a matrix of size [val num*(T -i) X
CompSize(T-1)] where CompSize(T-1) is the number of states at the last date (see
below in Module 4). Each val num rows correspond to a period (The first val num
rows to period i+1, the next val num rows to period i+2, ..., the last val num rows
to period T ). Each val num rows are ordered according to the order of the lattice
dynamic values. In the rows corresponding to period i, the number of valid columns
is CompSize(i).
• Values(c date,c list,n list,n value): Produces dynamic value arrays for all the
states of date c date. To that end, it calls the Descend function (see Module 4 below),
which computes the descendants and the probabilities of getting to the descendants.
The other arguments of Values are: c list— the list of nodes in date c date. n list,
n value— the list of nodes in date c date+1 and their dynamic values. Notice the size
of n value is [val num X length of n list ].
The function returns the value arrays packaged in a single matrix answer whose size
is [val num X length of n list ].
The computation of the values is as follows: for each state in c list we call Descend to
receive its descendants and the probability to reach those descendants. The evaluation
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of each dynamic value now follows from its recursive definition, which is described
below.
Each row in answer stores a different value according to the order of the parameter
display type.
Computation of the lattice dynamic values:
– The project quality (µV C) is given by the state’s value (part of the Module 4).





max(µV Ci + F
∗
i − li+1, 0), if i = T − 1;
max
(







, if i ≤ T − 2.
(176)
• MuStar(StVal): This function computes and returns the trigger policy. It’s ar-
gument, StVal, contains the lattice dynamic values described above. The function
returns an array size [1 X T ] containing µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
T .
• TestRes(mu star): This function receives the trigger policy and runs a Monte Carlo
simulation of the model. It computes the following economical results: Res1, ..., Res7,
expected VC share (i.e. the continuation value), expected net firm value and the
expected total investment as defined in Section A.3.
A.3.4 Module 4 - Lattice Construction
File List:
1. States.m contains the function States.
2. Descend.m contains the functions Descend and Probability.
3. CompSize.m contains the function CompSize.
Detailed Description:
The design of the lattice is as follows. In date zero there is a single node whose state
value is mu 0. The number of states in the next date is num states, and thereafter in
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each date states inc nodes are added. The value of a state at date i describes µi. We
allow for the state values to increase from date i to date i + 1 in the following manner.




. Similarly, the lowest value




. (See derivations below in the discussion of
the function Probability.) The other states’ values will be equally spread between the two
extreme states.
General Comment: All the state lists are given in arrays whose size is [1 X CompSize(T-
1)] where CompSize(T-1) is the number of states at the last date (see below). This is to
ensure that all lists are of the same length. However, the number of relevant cells in each
array varies and depends on the number of states in the date.
• States(i): This function returns all the states of date i. An array containing all the
possible values of µi is returned to the calling command. The relevant cells in the
returned array lie between the first cell and the CompSize(i)th cell.
• Descend(cdate, mu, NStates): A function that searches for the descendants of
state mu from date cdate, where candidate descendants are given in NStates. NStates
is the list of states in date following the date of mu, and next size is the cdate+1. The
function returns pointers to the first and least descendant cells, startpos and endpos,
respectively. (recall, the lattice structure is such that the state values are sorted
increasing.) To be a descendant of mu a candidate state must be within std inc times
stdev from mu.
In addition, the function returns StateProb, an array containing the probabilities to
reach the descendant. Similarly to the state lists, the probability list is also of size
[1 X CompSize(T-1)]. The relevant data of this array lies between cells startpos and
endpos.
• Probability(mu,b range, t range): Computes the probability of going from state
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mu) to the range [b range, t range]. Following the following formula
Prob[µi+1 < x] = (177)
= Prob





















where the third line is since Yi+1 ∼ N(µi, s2 + σ2i ). Replacing x with b range and
t range and taking the difference between the probabilities (top minus bottom) gives
us the required probability.
• Compsize(i) Computes the number of nodes in date i.
A.3.5 Module 5 - Result Presentation
File name DispRes.m contains the functions DispRes, OpenDisplay, OpenDisCal, Display-
DetPath, DisplayZero, DisplayAll, DisplayCalExp, DispMuRes, DispCalBase and CloseDis-
play.
We describe the main function of this module, DispRes. The rest of the functions receive
data from DispRes and display it.
DisplayResults(phase,data,experiment): The argument phase’s value is from (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
with each value requiring the following actions:
1. Initializing the file. In this case data and experiment are disregarded.
2. Display the deterministic path. In this case data is the deterministic path matrix
whereas experiment is disregarded. The deterministic path is displayed only in a
single experiment scenario.
3. Display the lattice dynamic values. If single experiment scenario then displays either
ZERO DISPLAY or ALL DATES DISPLAY or both (depending on the value of
the parameter display zero). In multi experiment scenario only ZERO DISPLAY is
displayed. In the calibration process there is no lattice dynamics value display.
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4. Displays the trigger policy and the economic results of the model. If not a calibration
scenario then displays all the economical results. If a calibration scenario then displays
only the first seven results.
5. Closing the file. In this case data and experiment are disregarded.
A.3.6 Module 6 - Calibration
File List:
1. calibrate.m
2. CBaseNum.m contains the functions CBaseNum and CompDistance.
3. CCalVal3.m contains the function CCalVal3.
4. CFineTune.m contains the function CFineTune.
Detailed Description:
• calibrate.m : This is the main procedure of the calibration process. Recall, in the
initial step of the calibration process the calibration grid is a five dimensional grid
with each dimension representing one of the calibrated parameters - α, γ, k, L and
λ). The value of points on each dimension is stored in cal val (an array of size [5 X
num values]). We also store the distance between the points (recall they are equally
spaced so each dimension has one such distance to store) for each dimension/parameter
in step val (an array of size [5 X 1]). We now call the function CBaseNum to receive
the initial base numbers. In the next step we run a number of iteration to fine tune
the grid search. The result of each iteration is another set of basic numbers. The
basic numbers of the last iteration are chosen as the basic numbers of the calibrated
parameters.
• CBaseNum(num values, cal val): This function receives the number of points in
each dimension of the grid (num values) and their values (cal val). For each permu-
tation of these values it runs an experiment (computing the deterministic path, the
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lattice dynamic values and the monte carlo simulation) using the other modules of
the code. Given the experiment results, it computes the distance from the empiri-
cal evidence and returns the parameters’ values of the experiment with the minimal
distance. These values are the basic numbers.
• CompDistance(ExpResults): This function receives the current experiment’s re-
sults and returns their distance from the empirical evidence.
• CFineTune(param val,cstep val,index): This function computes the new basic
numbers in the second step of the calibration process. In this step we are fine tun-
ing the grid iteratively. Given the current base numbers param val and the current
distance between points on the grid cstep val, it invokes CCalVal3 to receive the new
grid parameters. Next it computes the new basic numbers from CBaseNum. The
third argument of CFineTune, index denotes which iteration of basic numbers is now
handled and is used for purpose of display. CFineTune returns the basic numbers
(size [1 X 5]) and the new distance between points on the grid (size [5 X 1]).
• CCalval3(param val,cstep val): This function receives the current base numbers
param val and the current distance between points on the grid cstep val. It returns
the parameters for a finer grid search in the following manner. Each dimension of
the new grid contains three points that are centered around the current base value of
the parameter represented by that dimension. If the current base number is equal to
the upper (lower) limit of the feasible region of that parameter then the three points
are the current base number and below (above) it. The new distance between points
is half (one third in the equal to limit cases) of the current distance between points.
The function CCalVal3 returns the new values of each dimension (size [5 X 3]) and
the new distance between points (size [5 X 1]).
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